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INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, under trade-dress law,' product features can be
protected from imitation in the market. This protection allows manu-
facturers to advertise their "brand names" through their products' de-
signs without fear of competitors passing off imitation goods as
originals. However, the courts have held that the "functional" fea-
tures on a product can never be protected under trade-dress law.2
1 The Supreme Court defines "trade dress" as "'the total image of a product which
may include features such as size, shape, color, or color combinations, textures, graphics,
or even particular sales techniques.'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
764 n.1 (1992) (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980
(11th Cir. 1983)). Thus, in the strictest sense, the term "trade-dress law" refers to the
protections reserved for the designs or features on a product or on its packaging, while
"trademark law" refers to the protections granted for words or phrases. See Duraco Prods.
v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438-42 (3d Cir. 1994) (clarifying the distinction be-
tween trade-dress and trademark law).
For purposes of this Note, however, the term "trademark" will be used to refer to the
general class of perpetual protection allotted to both trademarks and trade dress. In addi-
tion, the terms "trade-dress" law and "trademark law," as used in this Note, will also cover
the corresponding statutory and common-law forms of relief provided by the various states
and American territories. See infra note 64.
2 See, e.g., Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1989)
("[Albsent other factors, functional shapes are not subject to appropriation by manufactur-
ers." (emphasis added to demonstrate that this is not a bright-line rule)). But seeAmerican
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Neverthe-
less, if the functional feature or combination is also found to have acquired secondary
meaning, the imitator may be required to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of
source confusion."); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195
11171998]
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The functionality limitation upon trade-dress protection is ajudi-
cial expression of two basic policy considerations. First, the function-
ality doctrine prevents suppliers of a product from monopolizing the
indispensable features of the product. Thus, the original manufac-
turer cannot diminish supply-side competition over the market for the
product by making it legally impossible to create different brands of
that particular product.3 Second, the functionality bar prevents trade-
dress law from permanently securing designs that are more properly
guarded by transitory species of intellectual-property law, such as pat-
ents or copyrights.4 Thus, for example, in the early cases concerning
functionality, courts held that manufacturers could not preclude com-
petitors from copying such designs as the features on a clamp 5 or the
shape of a drill bit,6 because the monopolization of those designs
would exclude competitors from the market for those kinds of clamps
and drill bits respectively, and also because those features could be
protected by patents.
Questions regarding functionality became increasingly difficult
for courts to resolve as the focus of disputes turned from utilitarian
designs to ornamental ones. More recently, for example, the courts
have been confronted with the question of whether aesthetic charac-
teristics such as china patterns, 7 lamp designs, 8 or totebag features9
are functional. The bench has offered no clear response, and conse-
quently, this "aesthetic functionality" problem remains one of the
most troublesome issues in trademark law.' 0
(lst Cir. 1980) ("[Clopying functional aspects required defendant to take special precau-
tionary steps to ensure that buyers would not be misled as to source .... ").
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. e (1995) ("The rules
governing the protection of trademarks must also be responsive to the public interest in
fostering competition .... In some cases, the recognition of exclusive rights in favor of a
particular seller may... deprive competitors of access to product features necessary for
effective competition.").
4 See generally Douglas R. Wolf, Note, The Doctrine of Elections: Has the Need to Choose
Been Lost?, 9 CAmozo Airs & ENr. L.J. 439 (1991) (describing the doctrine of elections,
which requires the holder of the rights to an invention or design to select only one specific
form of intellectual-property protection for the invention or design).
5 See, e.g., West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 595-99 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955).
6 See, e.g., Bowdil Co. v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 216 F.2d 156, 160-61 (8th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 936 (1955).
7 See, e.g., Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Systems, Inc., 999 F.2d
619, 620 (2d Cir. 1993); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 340 (9th Cir. 1952).
8 See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 823 (3d Cir. 1981).
9 See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1985).
10 See Erin M. Harriman, Aesthetic Functionality: The Disarray Among Modem Courts, 86
TRADEMARK REP. 276, 276 (1996); Daniel C. Hudock, Note, Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prod-
ucts Co.: Color Receives Trademark Protection and the Courts Receive Confusion, 16 J.L. & COM.
139, 149-52 (1996) (accusing the Court of disturbing settled understandings of aesthetic
functionality).
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A primary reason for the uncertainty in the case law stems from
the simple fact that, despite its importance to trademark law, the func-
tionality doctrine is one of the least understood concepts in intellec-
tual property." Indeed, there is not even a workable definition for
"functionality."12 Although the Supreme Court has held that a feature
is functional if it is "'essential to the use or purpose of the article or if
it affects the cost or value of the article,"1 3 this definition has not
proven usable in practice.' 4 For mostjurisdictions, it is not even possi-
ble to say with certainty whether any particular test or paradigm for
functionality is favored.
The purpose of this Note is fourfold. First, this Note attempts to
trace the conceptual lineages of the various progeny descended from
the Court's definition of "functionality." Until now, commentators in
this area have almost uniformly eschewed describing the mechanics
behind the various tests for functionality in favor of addressing under-
lying theoretical concerns. 5 Such discussions, however, seldom ex-
amine the practical dimensions of trade-dress law. Thus, before
engaging the abstract, this Note surveys the entire corpus of federal
appellate case law, explores the operation of functionality's various
tests, and elicits the distinctions between them.
11 Courts and commentators alike have bemoaned the chaotic development of this
doctrine. For particularly notable lamentations, see Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An
Overview, 34 UCIA L. Rnv. 1341, 1359-74 (1987) (surveying various approaches to function-
ality and bleakly noting that "[a) complete canvass [of the several competing views on the
meaning of functionality] would take one through most of the circuit courts of appeal.");
A. Samuel Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L. REv. 925,
951-63 (1985) (surveying the history of aesthetic functionality and concluding that "[f]rom
the outset, 'aesthetic functionality' has proved to be a most controversial and ill-defined
concept"); Beth F. Dumas, Note, The Functionality Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyight In-
fringement Actions: A Call for Clarification, 12 HASINGs Comm. & ENT. LJ. 471,480-89 (1990)
("[T]he courts rarely set forth a clear, summary definition of functionality. Instead, the
courts engage in discussions sprinkled with case law quotations and policy platitudes.").
12 See Sicila Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 422 (5th Cir.) ("Other circuits
have provided differing definitions of functionality that have resulted in nonuniform appli-
cation of the doctrine."), reh'g denied, 736 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1984); Elizabeth A. Over-
camp, The Qualitex Monster- The Color Trademark Disaster, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 595, 600
(1995) ("All the circuits recognize the doctrine of utilitarian functionality, but define func-
tionality in different ways.").
13 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood
Lab. v. Ives Lab., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)), revg 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994).
14 See Lisa T. Oratz, User Interfaces: Copyright vs. Trade Dress Protection, CoMPturER Law.,
January 1996, at 5 (commenting that the Supreme Court's definitional "language by itself
does not really provide much guidance").
15 Although a number of commentators have divided the body of functionality case
law along jurisdictional lines, see, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS McCARTm, McCAuRrT ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAI CoMP=-rrxoN § 7:80, at 7-167 to -176 (4th ed. 1997), only one other author has
attempted to identify the tests in a conceptual manner. See Dumas, supra note 11. How-
ever, this Note's breakdown of the tests for functionality diverges from the analysis
presented in her piece.
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Second, this Note suggests that the Court's definition is difficult
to apply because it contains two divergent conceptions of functional-
ity.1 6 As mentioned above, the Court has defined a functional feature
to be one that is "'essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or value of the article.""' 17 One understanding of func-
tionality that this Note uncovers (which this Note will call the "identifi-
cation theory") focuses on the "affects the cost or value" portion of
the Court's definition. Under the identification theory, a functional
feature is one that imparts any value or utility to the product beyond
identification of the source or manufacturer.' 8 The other concept of
functionality (the "competition theory") is expressed in the "'essential
to the use or purpose"' language in the Court's definition. Conse-
quently, and in contrast to the identification theory, the competition
theory regards features as functional only if they inhibit
competition.19
Third, this Note argues that the disagreement between the identi-
fication theory and the competition theory over a general understand-
ing of functionality gives rise to the aesthetic functionality problem.20
A feature that is "essential to the use or purpose" of a product is al-
most certain to "affect[ ] the cost or value" of that article; yet, a fea-
ture that "affects the cost or value" of an article is not necessarily
"essential to [its] use or purpose." Thus, a conflict between the identi-
fication theory and the competition theory occurs whenever a feature
"affects the cost or value" of a product, but is not "essential to [its] use
or purpose." Decorative, as opposed to utilitarian, features fall
squarely within this unsettled area, thereby framing the aesthetic func-
tionality problem.
Finally, this Note concludes that the aesthetic functionality prob-
lem can best be resolved by employing only the tests under the identi-
fication theory. Positing that the functionality requirement exists to
protect competition and to isolate trademark law from other forms of
intellectual-property protection,2 1 this Note argues that the tests
under the identification theory are more effective at fulfilling these
purposes and therefore, should be preferred over the tests under the
competition theory.22
16 See Andrea Falk, Comment, Harmonization of the Patent Act and Federal Trade Dress
Law: A Critique ofVornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corp., 21 J. Corn. L. 827,
843 (1996) (describing the Supreme Court's definition of functionality as a "two-part defini-
tion [which] does not eliminate the conflict between trade-dress and patent protection"
(emphasis added)).
17 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Lab., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10).
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part III.
20 See infra Part IV_
21 See infra Part IV.B.
22 See infra Part IV.C.
1120 [Vol. 83:1116
AESTHETIC FUNCTIONA1
Resolving the confusion over aesthetic functionality is important
for two significant reasons. First, clarity in this area of the law will
better enable manufacturers to determine whether imitation of a
competitor's successful product designs is permissible.23 Second, the
scope of the functionality doctrine implicates the breadth of trade-
mark protection, which, in turn, fundamentally affects the roles that
the copyright and patent laws play in our system of intellectual
property.24
Part I of this Note reviews the purposes and the statutory law of
trademark protection. Parts II and III present the various tests em-
ployed in determining whether a feature is functional, respectively cat-
egorizing these tests under the identification-theory and competition-
theory paradigms developed in this Note. Part IV describes the rela-
tionship between the two theories and the resultant aesthetic func-
tionality problem. A conclusion summarizes the findings contained
herein.
I
THE LAW OF TRADE-DREss PROTECTION
A. Purposes of Trade-Dress Law
Before discussing the black-letter law of trade-dress protection, it
is useful to explore the purposes of trademark law in general. It is
now a commonplace presumption in economics that consumers often
cannot ascertain the quality of any given product they intend to buy
before they buy it.25 A consumer knows the product's quality with
certainty only after the product has been experienced (which often
occurs after the product has been consumed). Consequently, before
experiencing the good, the consumer is unable to determine accu-
rately how much he would be willing to pay for the product. Trade-
marks help to remedy this informational problem by providing the
consumer with some reputational expectations about the quality of
the product.
The role of trademarks as information-providers may be more
readily understood through an example. 26 Suppose a consumer is
shopping for coffee beans in a world without such things as brand-
23 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv.
887, 888 & nn. 5-7 (quantifying the potential magnitude of this problem on industry).
24 See infra Parts IV.B.2 & IV.C.2.
25 One of the classic treatments of the incomplete-information problem is given in A.
MICHAEL SPENCE, MAR=E SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED
SCREENING PROCESSES (1974).
26 This example is a hybrid of a hypothetical from William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Tradomark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J.L. & EcoN. 265, 268-69 (1987), and the
landmark analysis employed in George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncer-
tainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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names, warranties, or free "trial samples." (To keep this example sim-
ple, there are only two kinds of coffee in this world: good and bad.)
All coffee is therefore sold in unmarked bins with each bin containing
coffee from a specific manufacturer. Although the consumer could
inspect the coffee beans for attributes such as color or size, he cannot
discern important attributes such as taste. 27 Moreover, even if he
could accurately predict the taste of coffee by inspection, it may be
prohibitively costly or inconvenient for him to rummage through
countless bins of coffee beans in an attempt to locate one of the cov-
eted batches of good coffee.
In other words, prior to the purchase, it may be impossible or
impracticable for the consumer to know whether he is about to
purchase good coffee. Assuming all other desiderata (e.g., color and
bean size) are identical, a rational consumer would be willing to pay
more for good-tasting coffee than bad-tasting coffee. Unfortunately,
because he would not be able to tell whether the coffee he has se-
lected is good or bad, he would be unable to determine how much he
would be willing to pay for the coffee before he purchases (and con-
sumes) it. Thus, the consumer would never be willing to pay good-
coffee prices because the coffee he actually purchases might turn out
to be of the bad-tasting variety. Assuming (as is likely to be the case)
that it costs more to supply good coffee than bad coffee, when profit-
maximizing manufacturers realize the consumer's dilemma, they
would not market good coffee because they know that no one would
be willing to pay good-coffee prices for them. The end result is a
world with only bad coffee. 28
In order to prevent such a market failure, manufacturers have
created various mechanisms to assure consumers of value. For exam-
ple, warranties assure consumers that, even if they unknowingly
purchase a low-quality product, they can either get their money back
or receive a high-quality product in exchange. 29 Because the con-
sumer knows that he will ultimately receive a satisfactory product, the
consumer is willing to "risk" paying high-quality prices for the war-
ranted product. Moreover, the warranty suggests to consumers that
27 For further thoughts on the distinction between attributes that could be evaluated
by inspection ("search goods") and those which could only be evaluated by consumption
("experience goods"), please see one of the earliest articles in which this pivotal distinction
appeared, Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970).
28 The inability of a product to be commodified due to informational constraints is
presumed prima facie by economists to be undesirable. See Akerlof, supra note 26. This
author finds no countervailing factors that rebut such a presumption in this example. But
seeJosefJoffe, Histy in a Hazelnut Shell, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 1, 1997, at A15, reprinted as Good
Coffee May Doom Us-Why a Great Empire Needs to Drink SwiI4 SACRAMENTo BEE, Sept. 7, 1997,
at F1 (theorizing that the hard hand of bad java drove some of the world's greatest civiliza-
tions to expand in search of more temperate refreshments).
29 See Akerlof, supra note 26, at 499.
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the warranted product is good because the consumers can see that the
manufacturer would have to expend resources for the product's re-
pair or replacement if the product were of poor quality.a0
Another method designed to prevent market failure is sam-
pling.31 Food vendors sometimes provide free samples of their prod-
ucts to potential consumers in order to "educate" those consumers
about the exact quality of their goods.3 2 For more durable goods,
such as cars or computers, salespeople often permit "test drives."33
Sampling gives consumers a clearer picture of the product they are
purchasing, which helps the consumer make a more informed
purchasing decision.
Lastly, the trademark is one of the most common transmitters of
commercial information. As the coffee example demonstrates, in the
absence of trademarks, many goods would be indistinguishable.
Thus, in a world without trademarks, a seemingly endless array of sim-
ilar-looking choices would confront coffee purchasers. Trademarks
permit consumers to readily identify a good with a particular reputa-
tion and to make purchasing decisions based on that reputation.3 4 In
short, trademarks simplify the task of associating products with certain
expectations.
This Note identifies four specific goals of trademark law consis-
tent with the elemental purposes of trademark protection. First,
trademark law attempts to protect a firm's reputation. Second, trade-
mark law protects firms from unjust enrichment by imitators. Third,
trademark law facilitates meaningful consumer choice in the market.
Last, trademark law encourages the production of high-quality
products.
30 See William Boulding & Amna Kirmani, A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of
Signaling Theoy: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?, 20 J. CONSUMER RES.
111, 112-14 (1993).
31 SeeWmLuM A. ROBINSON, BESrSALES PROMOTIONS 311 (6th ed. 1987) ("'if you have
a good product that fills specific consumer needs better than the competition, sampling is
the best way to create a new consumer franchise.'" (quoting Ed Meyer, Sampling Builds
Business, ADVERTISING AGE, July 12, 1982, at M22)).
32 See, e.g., id. at 110-16 (describing how free, Nutrasweet-flavored gumballs were
mailed to households across America in an effort to promote the artificial sweetener).
33 See, e.g., id. at 168-71 (identifying the Apple Computers Corporation's 1984 invita-
tion to "[ t] ake Macintosh out for a test drive" overnight for free as a sampling mechanism).
34 See, e.g., Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1981)
("If the Vuitton mark increases consumer appeal only because of the quality associated
with Vuitton goods, or because of the prestige associated with owning a genuine Vuitton
product, then the design is serving the legitimate function of a trademark; it is identifying
the source of the product....").
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1. Protection of Firms from Misassociation
Trademark law protects a firm's reputation from undesirable as-
sociations. 35 For example, an imitator who markets inferior goods
under the guise of another firm might diminish the public's confi-
dence in the original producer by confusing the public about the
quality of the original producer's goods.
3 6
In addition, an infringer who associates the trademark of another
firm with socially repugnant ideas could ruin that firm's goodwill. For
example, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,3 7
the defendant filmmaker produced "a gross and revolting sex film"
depicting fictitious members of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders "en-
gag[ing] in various sex acts while clad or partially clad in the [Cheer-
leaders'] uniform."38  In holding that both the Cheerleaders'
trademark (the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders' name) and its trade
dress (the uniforms) had been infringed, Judge Van Graafeiland
explained:
"The gist of [a trademark] action is that the plaintiff has a property
interest in the [mark], built up at great expense, and that it and its
products are favorably known as a result of its use of this property
right and that the defendant... [may] bring direct financial loss to
the plaintiff, both by reason of confusing the source of the defen-
dant's product, and by reason of the peculiarly unwholesome associ-
ation of [other] ideas.. .."39
By permitting the owner of a trademark to hold exclusive rights in the
use of that mark, trademark law enables a party to protect its reputa-
tion from the interference of others.40 In more theoretical terms,
35 See SETH E. LIPNER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECrS OF GRAY MARKET GOODS 37-
55 (1990) ("[P]erhaps the judiciary has been too quick to equate the source identifying
function of trademarks with the quality/goodwill function. The former... suffers injury
only from counterfeit goods .... while the latter interest can be damaged by at least some
gray market [i.e., inferior imitation] goods."); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) ("[T]rademark law.., seeks to promote competition by protect-
ing a firm's reputation .... .").
36 See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contrac-
tual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 617 n.3 (1981) ("Nonidentification of firm output
leads to quality depreciation via a standard externality argument; i.e., supply by a particular
firm of lower than anticipated quality imposes a cost through the loss of future sales not
solely on that firm but on all firms in the industry.").
37 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
38 Id. at 202-03.
39 Id. at 205 (quoting Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d
433, 437 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963)).
40 But see International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
918 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) ("[O]ur reading of the Lanham Act
and its legislative history reveals no congressional design to bestow such broad property
rights [e.g., the right to freedom from aspersions] on trademark owners.").
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trademark law reserves the property right to destroy or damage repu-
tation exclusively for the reputation-holder.41
2. Prevention of Goodwill Misappropriation
Just as trademark law prohibits the destruction of another firm's
goodwill, it also prevents the misappropriation of that goodwill.4 2
This form of protection arms the trademark holder with a claim for
unjust enrichment,43 the most common cause of action in trademark
cases. Trademark law enjoins a firm from stealing the good reputa-
tion of a competitor and passing off its own goods as those of the
competitor.44 Conversely, trademark law prevents a firm that has
become known for producing superior goods from being robbed
of its hard-earned reputation by competitors.45 Thus, a trade-
41 Internet Subcommittee of the International Trademark Association, !NTA White
Paper (version 2.1, last modified Nov. 18, 1997) <http://www.inta.org/wptoc.htm>.
42 See Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[To
the extent that the product feature or design at issue enhances the distinctiveness of the
product, there is a risk that failure to protect the feature or design will cause confusion and
allow competitors to benefit unfairly from the original manufacturer's investment in its product's ap-
pearance." (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 258 (2d
Cir. 1957) (Where defendant imitated plaintiff's red heart-shaped design for a pill, the
court held that "[the plaintiffs] purpose was to benefit from the favorable repute which
plaintiff had established for its products.").
43 See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980)
("[T]he essence of a claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is that a competitor's
packaging or labeling deceives purchasers as to the source of its goods; i.e., that consumers
buy the competitor's product thinking it to be that of the plaintiff.").
44 See, e.g., Upjohn, 246 F.2d at 258 ("The confusion of defendant's products with
plaintiff's products was defendant's work. His purpose was to benefit from the favorable
repute which plaintiff had established for its products."). Some economists have hypothe-
sized that incomplete information forces a manufacturer to build up a reputation only
after an initial period of marketing high-quality goods at low-quality prices. See Carl Sha-
piro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 659, 660
(1983). Moreover, any use of a trademark (i.e., advertising) is an investment in reputation.
See Klein & Leffler, supra note 36, at 632. Thus, from an economic perspective, a claim for
unjust enrichment may encompass more than a claim for reputation, but also for the in-
vestments necessary to creating and maintaining the reputation.
45 The Supreme Court explained this principle in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf.
The redress that is accorded in trade-mark cases is based upon the
party's right to be protected in the good-will of a trade or business....
Where a party has been in the habit of labeling his goods with a distinctive
mark, so that purchasers recognize goods thus marked as being of his pro-
duction, others are debarred from applying the same mark to goods of the
same description, because to do so would in effect represent their goods to
be of his production and would tend to deprive him of the profit he might
make through the sale of the goods which the purchaser intended to buy.
240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); see also S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S.
1274, 1274 ("[Wlhere the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappro-
priation by pirates and cheats.").
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mark creates an exclusive property right in the use of one's own
reputation. 46
3. Facilitation of Meaningful Consumer Participation in the Market
Trademark law also permits meaningful consumer participation
in the market.47 Meaningful consumer participation serves two goals.
First, it enables consumers to purchase what they believe they are
purchasing.48 By proscribing the deceptive advertisement of goods,
trademark law prevents unscrupulous manufacturers from duping
consumers into purchasing goods that they would not have bought
but for the deception. 49
Second, facilitation of meaningful consumer participation pro-
motes clarity of the consumer's voice in the marketplace. Consumer
participation in the market is not limited to the mere acquisition of
merchandise. Each time a consumer purchases a good in the market,
he also provides information about his preferences to producers.50 A
consumer indicates approval whenever he purchases a product,51 and
46 See Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919 ("A trademark owner has a property right only
insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion as to who produced the goods and to
facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner's goods.").
47 See S. REP. No. 79-1333, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1274, 1274 ("One [purpose
underlying any trademark statute] is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get."); see also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d
562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Without some.., method of product identification, informed
consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exist.").
48 See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 659 ("When product attributes are difficult to observe
prior to purchase, consumers may plausibly use the quality of products produced by the
firm in the past as an indicator of present or future quality.").
49 See Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The
law of trade dress protects the public against confusion as to the source of a product where
the confusion arises from similarity of packaging or design."); Hygienic Specialties Co. v.
H.G. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1962) ("Consumer protection has been
limited.., to the prevention of confusion, i.e., the customer should not be misled into purchas-
ing an article from one producer in the belief that it was made by someone else or emanates from some
other (but unidentified) source." (emphasis added)).
50 Klein and Leffler describe the market signaling mechanism in the following
manner.
If producers are to have an incentive to produce high quality products
(in the absence of governmentally enforceable contracts), consumers must
somehow reward high quality production and punish low quality produc-
tion. We assume in this competitive framework that consumers will
purchase from particular sellers randomly chosen from the group of homo-
geneous sellers over which consumer information is transmitted. If a con-
sumer receives a product of a quality at least as high as implicitly contracted
for, he will continue to purchase randomly from this group of sellers. On
the other hand, if quality is less than contracted for, all consumers cease to
purchase from the particular sampled "cheating" firm.
Klein & Leffler, supra note 36, at 620.
51 See id.
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disapproval whenever he chooses not to purchase a product.52 In
other words, the collective purchasing decisions of all consumers in
the market "tell" producers what the consumers want.5 3
Because consumers often distinguish products by brand-names
(i.e., trademarks) or packaging (i.e., trade dress), 54 non-deceptive
brand-naming or packaging is essential to ensure that each con-
sumer's purchasing decision is properly informed. Trademarks pro-
vide this information by ensuring that consumers are not misled into
purchasing products that they would not have purchased but for the
misinformation. Trademark law thus renders consumer purchases
more meaningful.
4. Encouragement of Production of High-Quality Products
Lastly, trademarks encourage manufacturers to produce well-
made products.5 5 This goal is intimately related to trademark law's
goal of facilitating meaningful consumer participation in the market.
In the absence of trademark and unfair competition laws, competitors
are free to imitate each other's products and to misrepresent the
source of those products. Thus, manufacturers have no incentive to
produce goods that are superior in inconspicuous ways.5 6 Trademark
protection corrects this market failure by providing an incentive for
all forms of innovation, regardless of conspicuousness. Under a trade-
mark regime (and assuming no other forms of intellectual-property
protection), competitors are only permitted to copy each other's
products. They may not appropriate each other's name and reputa-
tion. Thus, each competitor has more incentive to associate superior
52 See id.
53 Cf id. at 618 (using model of perfect information among all consumers in order to
simulate collective behavior); Shapiro, supra note 44, at 664 (same).
54 See Akerlof, supra note 26, at 499-500.
55 As the coffee example demonstrates, in the absence of a quality-signaling mecha-
nism (such as a system of trademark law), a market for high-quality products may not be
sustainable because there would be no way for a manufacturer to convince consumers of
the superiority of their products. See genera//y id. (describing brand-name identification as
an indispensable guaranty to the consumer of the quality of a given product).
56 A manufacturer has every incentive to suggest that it produces a higher-quality
product either by augmenting the product with some conspicuous improvement or with
cosmetic refinements. However, without trademark protection, a manufacturer has no ec-
onomically justifiable incentive to better its product in ways that are not immediately dis-
cernable to a consumer because competitors could deliberately confuse the market by
misappropriating the manufacturer's trademark as their own. See Klein & Leffler, supra
note 36, at 621 (observing that in the absence of a reputation, "consumers would be willing
to pay only the costless information price of the minimum quality product whose quality
they can verify prepurchase"); Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller
Reputation, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 20, 21-22 (1982).
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products with its name because there is no threat of that association
being stolen or damaged without redress. 57
Preservation of a market for high-quality products and the facili-
tation of meaningful consumer participation are also closely entwined
with concepts of market efficiency.58 "Efficient" markets are those
that behave responsively to consumer demand.5 9 Specifically, effi-
cient markets sell goods at quantities and prices that accurately re-
flect, among other things, consumer demands for them. Assuming
that consumers prefer high-quality products over low-quality products,
their collective purchasing decisions will drive the price of superior
products above the price of inferior ones.60 By ensuring that potential
purchasers are accurately informed as to the source of market
goods,61 trademark law assures accuracy in market pricing, and conse-
quently, efficiency in the market itself.
B. The Lanham Act and Related State Remedies
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Protection Act 62 pro-
vides in relevant part that:
[a] ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses... any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin .... which.. . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.63
Parallel causes of action authorized by the individual states and U.S.
territories supplement this provision of the Lanham Act.64
57 See S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1274, 1275 ("Trade-
marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the
good reputation which excellence creates."); see also Shapiro, supra note 56, at 24 (sug-
gesting the same by modelling a manufacturer who controls his reputation as a monopolist
over a specific good).
58 See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 26, at 265-66 (concluding that trademark
law "can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic
efficiency").
59 See RcHARD A. PosN_, ECONOMIc ANALYsIS OF LAw 271-84 (4th ed. 1992) (discuss-
ing inefficient, unresponsive pricing in the context of a monopoly).
60 See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 666-67.
61 See Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1989)
("The primary 'function' that [the trademark holder] claims for the [infringed feature) is
that the [feature] identif[ies] the product. That is precisely the purpose of a trademark;
thus, that function cannot be a valid grounds for attacking a trademark.").
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
63 Id. § 1125 (a) (1) (formatting altered).
64 Causes of action significantly related to such civil remedies are described in: ALA.
CODE §§ 8-12-17 (injunctive relief), 8-19-5 (1)-(3) & (5), 8-19-10(a) (1993); ALAsKA STAT.
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§§ 45.50.180 (d)-(e) (injunctive relief from trademark dilution and injury to reputation),
45.50.471(b) (1), (3)-(4), (7), (11), 45.50.531(a) (Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-71-
113 (injunctive relief from trademark dilution and injury to reputation), 4-88-107(a) (1)-
(2) & (10) (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (injunctive relief from dilution
or injury to business reputation), 17203 (injunctive relief from unfair trade practices)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b to 42-100g (unfair trade)
(West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532(a) (1)-(3) & (5), (8) (1993); Fi..6 STAT. ANN.
§§ 495.151 (primarily injunctive relief from trademark dilution and injury to reputation),
501.204(1) (unfair competition) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-372(a)
(1)-(3) & (5) (deceptive trade practices), 10-1-393(b) (1)-(3) & (5) (unlawful trade prac-
tices), 10-1-451(b) (primarily injunctive relief from trademark dilution and injury to repu-
tation), 10-1-470 & 10-1-471 (injunctive relief from infringement of organizational
emblems) (1994 & Supp. 1997); GuAM Civ. CODE § 90103(1) (business deceit) (1995);
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 481A-3(a) (1)-(3) & (5) (deceptive trade practices) (Michie 1995);
IDAHO CODE §§ 48-513 (primarily injunctive relief from trademark dilution and injury to
reputation), 48-603 (1)-(3) & (5) (unfair trade) (1997); 765 ILT. COmp. STAT. ANN. 1035/
15 (injunctive relief from infringement of organizational marks), 1040 (Counterfeit Trade-
mark Act) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); 815 ILL. Comv. STAT. ANN. 510/2 (1)-(3) & (5)
(deceptive trade) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626(b) (1) (A)-(B) (deceptive acts)
(1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.100 (intentionally false brands), 365.110 (unauthorized
reproduction of another manufacturer's mark) (Banks-Baldwin 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51.223 (injunctive relief from trademark dilution or injury to business reputation),
51.1405(A) (deceptive trade) (West 1987); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 2(a) (unfair com-
petition), ch. 10B, § 12 (injunctive relief from trademark dilution or injury to business
reputation) (Law. Co-op. 1994 & 1995); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 429.23 (injunctive re-
lief), 445.903(1) (a), (c) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.44(1) (1)-
(3) & (5), 325D.165 (primarily injunctive relief for trademark dilution and injury to busi-
ness reputation) (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-5(2) (a)-(c) & (e), 75-25-25 (pri-
marily injunctive relief against dilution or injury to business reputation) (Supp. 1997); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (1) (primarily injunctive relief against trademark dilution or injury to
business reputation) (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-334 (primarily injunc-
tive relief against trademark dilution and injury to business reputation), 30-14-103 (general
unfair or deceptive trade practices), 45-6-318(1) (e) & 45-6-318(3) (b) (deceptive business
practices) (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 87-302(a) (1)-(3) & (5), 87-122 (primarily injunctive
relief against trademark dilution and injury to business reputation) (1994); Nav. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 593.0915 (1)-(3) & (5); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A.2 (I)-(III) & (V), 350-k12
(general injunctive relief against dilution and injury to business reputation) (1995 & Supp.
1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:4-1 (unfair trade), 56:3-13.20 (primarily injunctive relief
against dilution or injury to business reputation) (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 57-12-2(d) (1)-(3) & (5) (unfair or deceptive trade), 57-38-1-15 (primarily injunctive
relief against trademark dilution and damage to business reputation) (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 1997); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 350-350a (false advertisement) (McKinney 1988 &
Supp. 1997-98), 3684d (primarily injunctive relief from trademark dilution or injury to busi-
ness reputation) (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 80-11.1 (whenjoined with §§ 80-12 &
75-1.1) (Michie 1997); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(b) (1) (Page 1993); OrLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 78, § 53(a) (1)-(3) & (5) (West Supp. 1998); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 646.608(1) (a)-(c)
& (e), 647.107 (primarily injunctive relief from trademark dilution or injury to business
reputation) (1988 & Supp. 1996); PENN. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 1124 (primarily injunc-
tive relief from trademark dilution or injury to business reputation), tit. 73, § 201-2(4) (i)-
(iii) & (v) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 1014 (1987); RI. GEN. LAws
§§ 6-2-11 (infringement of packaging), 6-2-12 (primarily injunctive relief from trademark
dilution or injury to business reputation), 6-13.1-1(5) (A)-(C) & (E) (deceptive trade)
(Michie 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (injunctive relief from infringement of fa-
mous marks) (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 37-6-2 &-3 (intentional counterfeit-
ing of distinctive marks) (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (primarily injunctive
relief from trademark dilution or injury to business reputation) (Michie 1996); TEx. Bus.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1116
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (1)-(3) & (5) (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-Iia-
3.(1) (a)-(c) & (e) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (1)-(3) (Michie
1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, § 102(a) (1) (consumer protection) (1987 & Supp. 1997);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (primarily injunctive relief from trademark dilution or
injury to business reputation) (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-13 (primarily injunc-
tive relief from dilution of famous marks or injury to business reputation) (Michie 1996);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105(a) (i)-(ii) (consumer protection) (Michie 1997).
Moreover, a vast majority of these jurisdictions implies common-law causes of action
for trade-dress infringement through explicit statutory disavowals of legislative preemp-
tion. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-19 (common law trademarks) (1993); ARuz. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-1452 (common-law trademarks), 44-1460.05(B) (common-law trade names) (West
1994); ARY. CODE ANN. §§ 4-71-102 (common-law trademarks), 4-88-107(10) (b) (common-
law unfair competition) (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14210 (West 1987);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-70-113 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11k (West 1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3315 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 495.161 (common-law unfair competi-
tion), 501.213(1) (common-law trademarks) (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-372(c)
(common-law unfair competition), 10-1-452 (common-law trademarks) (1994); HAw. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 481A-3(c) (common-law deceptive trade) (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE § 48-
516 (common-law trademarks) (1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1035/14 (common-law
trademarks) (West 1993); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/2 cl. 3 (common-law deceptive
trade) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-123 (common-law trademarks) (1989); Ky. Rxv.
STAT. ANN. § 365.25 (common-law trademarks) (1993); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 110B, § 14
(Law. Co-op. 1995); MrcH. COmp. LAWs ANN. § 429.44 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 325D.30 (common-law unfair competition), 333.30 (common-law trademarks) (West
1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-23 (common-law unfair competition), 75-25-31 (common-
law trademarks) (Law. Co-op. 1973 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.066(1) (West
Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-336 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-124 (common-
law trademarks), 87-302(c) (common-law unfair competition) (1994); NEv. Rxv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 598.0953 (common-law unfair trade practices); 600.440 (common-law trade-
marks); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-A.14 (common-law trademarks), 358-A-12 (common-
law unfair trade) (1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13:13 (common-law trademarks) (West
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(D) (common-law unfair competition) (Michie 1995);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-e (common law trademarks) (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 80-13 (Michie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-13 (1960); OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1329.67 (common-law trademarks), 1345.13 (common-law unfair competition) (Page
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 33 (common-law trademarks), 53(c) (common-law un-
fair trade practices) (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 646.656 (common-law
unfair competition), 647.115(1) (common-law trademarks) (1988); PENN. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 54, § 1126 (common-law trademarks) (West 1996); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, § 171x,
cl. 5 (no preemption of non-statutory remedies for trademark registrants) (Michie But-
terworth Supp. 1992); RI. GEN. LAws § 6-2-14 (common-law trademarks) (Michie 1992);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1180 (common-law trademarks) (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODFED
LAws §§ 37-6-27 (common-law trademarks), 37-24-7 (common-law unfair competition)
(Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-514 (common-law trademarks) (Michie 1996);
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.27(a) (common-law trademarks), 17.43 (common-law
unfair competition) (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1la-3.(6) (common-
law deceptive trade practices), 20-3-15 (common-law trademarks) (Michie 1996 & Supp.
1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2532 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-90 (Michie 1992); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit 12A, § 138 (common-law consumer protection) (1987); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 19.77.900 (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-16 (Michie 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 132.25 (West 1989); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-113 (Michie 1997).
In contrast, Alabama explicitly requires unfair-competition claimants to choose be-
tween statutory relief and common-law remedies. See ALA. CODE § 8-19-15 (1993). In addi-
tion, two states have implicit limitations on common-law causes of action for trade-dress
infringement. Section 445.903(2) of the Michigan Code forbids the attorney general from
naming unfair trade practices in addition to those specifically enumerated, MICH. CoMP.
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The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 43(a) to protect
product features or packaging (the product's "trade dress") from imi-
tation.65 Thus, Section 43 (a) is essentially a federal law of unfair com-
petition 66 that seeks to prevent confusion between products.67 In
order for a feature to qualify for protection under the Lanham Act
and related claims, courts have required that the allegedly infringed
feature meet two criteria: the feature must be both distinctive and
non-functional. 68
A feature is distinctive if it either has acquired "secondary mean-
ing" or is "inherently distinctive." 69 A feature acquires secondary
meaning when it becomes identified with a source (e.g., a manufac-
turer) in the minds of consumers. 70 A feature is "inherently distinc-
tive" if it has the potential to acquire secondary meaning.7'
A feature is functional "'if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."' 72 The
rationale behind the functionality doctrine is that the public interest
in certain inventions or designs outweighs an individual's right to use
LAWs ANN. § 445.903(2) (West Supp. 1997); and in 1997, New Mexico repealed a provision
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-12 (Michie 1995)) that granted relief from infringements of com-
mon-law trademarks, 1997 N.M. Laws ch. 197, § 17.
65 E.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992).
66 See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes not only trademark infringement
in its narrow sense, but more generally creates a federal cause of action for unfair competi-
tion. In particular, § 43(a) provides a cause of action for unprivileged imitation, including
trade dress infringement." (citation omitted)); Dumas, supra note 11, at 478; cf Keebler
Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The Lanham Act does
not preempt the states' ability to recognize and protect trademark rights."); Boston Prof I
Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975)
("While this court has rejected the view that the Lanham Act brought all claims of unfair
competition in interstate commerce within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal
courts, this court has recognized that [the Act] creates a federal cause of action for false
representation of goods or services in commerce." (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
991 (1975); see also Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1995) ("The Lanham Act expanded the private common law right of action for com-
mercial injuries resulting from deceptive advertising and marketing.").
67 See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1987)
("[T]he Lanham Act's purpose [is to] prevent[ ] confusion as to the source of products
68 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. Although the nonfunctionality criterion requires
nonfumctionality, in keeping with convention, this Note will refer to the requirement also
as the "functionality requirement" or the "functionality defense." See, e.g., Hartford House,
Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1988).
69 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citing RSTAT~mENT (THIRD) OF UNFAM COMPmErrON
§ 13 & cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990)).
70 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995).
71 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770-71.
72 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Lab. v. Ives Lab., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)).
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those inventions or designs as indicators of a product's source.73 Us-
ing this definition, the courts have formulated an arcane assortment
of tests and sub-definitions, seemingly without any consistent method-
ology.74 These tests and subdefinitions are thoroughly discussed in
the next two Parts of this Note, which present the two prevailing con-
ceptions of functionality: the identification and competition theories.
II
THE "IDENTFrCATlON" THEORY OF FUNCIONALrrY AND
ITS TESTS
A. The "Identification" Theory
The "identification" theory of functionality75 was the original un-
derstanding of functionality, which found expression in the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts.7 6 The Ninth Circuit's seminal opinion in Pagliero
v. Wallace China77 illuminated the shadowy contours of this theory:
"Functional"... might be said to connote other than a trade-mark
purpose. If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product, the interest in free competition
permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. On
the other hand, where the feature, or more aptly, design, is a mere
arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily
adopted for purposes of identification and individuality and, hence,
unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection with the prod-
73 SeeJeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[T]he purpose of trade dress law [is] to protect an owner of a dress in informing the
public of the source of its products, without permitting the owner to exclude competition from
functionally similar products." (emphasis added)).
74 See Overcamp, supra note 12, at 600.
75 This theory is sometimes referred to as the "aesthetic functionality" doctrine. See,
e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1981). Such terminology
engenders confusion, and this Note will decline to use the term "aesthetic functionality" in
this sense.
76 Under Section 742 of the First Restatement,
[a] feature of goods is functional ... if it affects their purpose, action
or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using
them; it is non-functional if it does not have any of such effects.
... When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their fea-
tures may be functional because they definitely contribute to that value and
thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended.
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 742 & cmt. a (1938). However,
[a] feature is non-functional if, when omitted, nothing of substantial
value in the goods is lost. A feature which merely associates goods with a
particular source may be, like a trade-mark or trade name, a substantial
factor in increasing the marketability of the goods. But if that is the entire
significance of the feature, it is non-functional; for its value then lies only in
the demand for goods associated with a particular source rather than for
goods of a particular design.
Id. § 742 cmt. a.
77 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
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uct, imitation may be forbidden [even] where the requisite showing
of secondary meaning is made.78
Under the identification theory, trademark law provides protec-
tion for a very narrow range of designs.79 Specifically, a feature can be
trademarked only if it serves to identify the manufacturer or sponsor
of the product.8 0 If a feature renders a product desirable for any rea-
son other than association with a source or sponsor, then it is "func-
tional" (i.e., serves a function other than identification of source).81
Consequently, such a feature may not receive trademark protection
under this theory.
This understanding of functionality is reflected in four interre-
lated tests currently used by the courts to determine functionality. Be-
cause the case law has not formally named these tests, this Note will
refer to them as the tests for "indicia of source," "commercial success,"
"actual benefit," and "consumer motivation."82
A caveat regarding the description of these tests is appropriate at
this point. The tests set forth in this Note rarely exist in the pristine
forms presented below. Courts have often labeled a test by one name
and then applied completely different standards. 8 3 The problem with
78 Id. at 343 (footnotes omitted).
79 See Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem. Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010
(5th Cir.) ("The statutory and case law of trademarks is oriented toward the use of such
marks to sell something other than the mark itself."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
80 See Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1981)
("'[TI he only legally relevant function of a trademark is to impart information as to the
source or sponsorship of the product. . . .The courts .. .have generally confined legal
protection to the trademark's source identification function for reasons grounded in pub-
lic policy favoring a free, competitive economy.'" (quoting Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d
562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968)) (last alteration in original)). The statement that "a feature can
be trademarked only if it seems to identify the manufacturer or sponsor of the product" is
a positive observation as well as a normative statement. "'Likelihood of confusion and
functional purpose, while separate doctrines, are related to the extent that the more func-
tional a feature is, the less likely it is that buyers will view it as unique or a distinctive symbol
of origin.'" Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676
F.2d 1079, 1083 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting opinion of the district court (citing 1 J.
THOMAS McCARTw, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.26 (1973))).
81 See Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994) ("A feature
or design is functional ... if it performs some function other than identifying the source of
goods.").
82 Other commentators have distinguished the melange of tests used by the courts
along other lines of thought. E.g., Dumas, supra note 11, at 480-90. The breakdown
presented in this Note represents the most discrete (i.e., the "least common denomina-
tor") analysis of the tests the courts currently use.
83 In a refreshing display of candor, the Seventh Circuit frankly acknowledged its own
complicity in producing some of the confusion over functionality.
The application of the "functionality" test is complicated by different
verbal formulations, sometimes appearing in the same opinions that recite
[common precedent]. For example, our opinion in Vaughan Manufacturing
Co. v. Brikam Internationa Inc. quoted the central language of W.T. Rogers
[which stated that a functional feature was one "costly to do without"] and
immediately followed with this language from Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v.
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identifying separate tests is compounded by the fact that they do not
always appear as bright-line standards in the case law. Rather, the
courts often use them as factors upon which the functionality of a
feature is weighed. These factor-based balancing tests, however, vary
in the requisite evidence and in the difficulty of proof. Because the
descriptions of the tests in this Note are intended both to inform the
practicing bar and to present the "real life" context upon which these
tests operate, this Note identifies the tests according to the method of
proof and denominates them by the most appropriate name available.
Section B of this Part describes four tests that fall under the iden-
tification theory. Section C then explains why they collectively form a
distinctive conception of functionality.
B. Four Tests Under the Identification Theory
1. The "Indicia of Source" Test
The test for "indicia of source" asks whether a feature serves only
to identify84 a source or sponsor of the product.8 5 If the feature's sole
effect is to identify a source or sponsor, then the feature is nonfunc-
Cox "To achieve the status of 'functional,' a design or feature must be supe-
rior or optimal in terms of manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian
function or performance[,]" then quoted the language from Cox as if it
were the holding of Vaughan and followed with a paraphrase from W.T.
Rogers. This would not be troubling if "superior or optimal" were the same
thing as "something costly to do without," but it is not. "Superior" could
mean something that is costly to do without, but "optimal" implies that un-
less the feature in question is the best possible way to achieve a result, it is not
"functional.".... In addition, our reference to an "essential" feature fur-
ther complicates the functionality test by creating the additional task of at-
taching an unusual meaning to a common term.
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc. 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted).
84 There is some confusion as to whether it is sufficient that the feature serve as an
indicia of source or whether the actual identity of the source must be associated with the
feature. Compare supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text with Greater Anchorage, Inc. v.
Nowell, 1992 WL 224238 at *3 (9th Cir. 1992) (declaring that even though a company's
products contain inscriptions that "'frequently include names and emblems that are also
used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive to conclude that the name or emblem is
desired because consumers believe that the product somehow originated with or was sponsored by the
organization the name or emblem signifies'" (emphasis added) (quoting International Order of
Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. deniedk 452 U.S.
441 (1981))), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 915 (1993), and id. at *4 (recognizing that when a court
determines "whether the use of a name serves... to identify the trademark owner as the
source or sponsor of goods, 'a court must closely examine the articles themselves, the de-
fendant's marketing practices, and any evidence that consumers have actually inferred a con-
nection between the defendant's product and the trademark owne?" (emphasis added) (quoting
job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919)).
This author believes, and will assume for the purposes of this Note, that the less strin-
gent "serves as indicia of source" requirement is proper because the recognition require-
ment confuses inquiry for functionality with that for secondary meaning. Cf Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770 (1992) (holding that inherently distinctive
trade dress need not have acquired secondary meaning before being protectable). The
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tional, and therefore, may be trademarked. 86 If the feature provides
any additional utility (e.g., enhances the efficacy of the product), then
the feature is functional and may not enjoy trade-dress protection.8 7
The indicia of source test seeks to confine the role of trademark pro-
tection to acting only as a "trade-mark" (i.e., a mark used to facilitate
trade).88 Thus, it ensures that trade-dress protection is not vested in
any manner incongruous with the primary purpose of trade-dress law.
For example, in International Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg &
Co.,89 the defendant marketed jewelry bearing emblems which were
created by the plaintiff organization as logos.90 On appeal, the court
observed that consumers purchased the jewelry for the attractiveness
of the design and not because the consumers made any association
between the jewelry's design and the plaintiff.91 Accordingly, the
court held that the jewelry design was functional and gave judgment
for the defendant.92
uncertainty over the precise interpretation of the indicia of source test does not affect the
analysis presented in this Note.
85 See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981) ("'Proof of
nonfunctionality generally requires a showing that the element of the product serves no
purpose other than identification [of source].'" (quoting SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab.,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980))).
86 See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 747 F.2d 844, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1984)
(nonfunctionality of a drug capsule's color), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985); Ideal Toy
Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming the finding that a
Rubik's Cube's colors were nonfunctional because "the particular colors used in [the] puz-
zle serve 'no purpose other than identification'" (quoting SK&F, 625 F.2d at 1063));
SK&F, 625 F.2d at 1064 (shape and color of pills were not functional partly because "[t]he
only value of the trade dress was in identifying the goods with their source"); Boston Prof'l
Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1013 (5th Cir.) (Hockey teams'
logos are nonfunctional because "the embroidered symbols are sold not because of any...
aesthetic characteristic but because ,they are the trademarks of the hockey teams."), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
87 See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 635 (3d
Cir. 1992) (affirming that roof zipper design was functional because plaintiff "has not car-
ried its burden of demonstrating 'that the element of the product serves no purpose other
than identification'" (quoting SK&F, 625 F.2d at 1063)).
88 Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1028 (9th Cir. 1985)
("'Functional... might be said to connote other than a trade-mark purpose.'" (quoting
Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Pagliero v.
Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)))), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986);
cf Boston Profl Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1010 ("The statutory and case law of trademarks is [sic]
oriented toward the use of such marks to sell something other than the mark itself.").
89 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 441 (1981).
90 Id. at 914.
91 Cf. id. at 918.
92 See id. at 920. Ordinarily, functionality is a question of fact, and not of law. The
court remanded for judgment (rather than for further proceedings) here because there
was no evidence that the consumers actually drew a connection between the jewelry's de-
signs and the plaintiff's emblems. See id. Had the plaintiff provided such evidence, a ques-
tion of fact would have been raised.
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In so holding, the court distinguished Boston Professional Hockey
Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.93 In Boston
Hockey, the defendant marketed cloth badges bearing the plaintiff or-
ganization's logo.94 In contrast to Job's Daughters, the court found that
the badges were not functional. 95 The operative difference between
these two cases was the Boston Hockey court's factual finding that the
"the embroidered symbols [we] re sold not because of any... aesthetic
characteristic but because they [we]re the trademarks of the hockey
teams."96 Thus, under the "indicia of source" test, a design must
strictly be found to identify a specific source in order to qualify for
trade-dress protection.
2. The "Actual Benefit" Test
The "actual benefit" test focuses on whether a feature confers any
benefit (e.g., mechanical utility or aesthetic pleasure) upon the prod-
uct other than information about, or association with, a source.97 If
the feature provides any such additional value, it is deemed to be
functional, and thus, unfit for trademark protection.98 On the other
93 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
94 Id. at 1009.
95 Id. at 1013.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Vuitton et Fils S. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)
("The policy [of this test] ... is aimed at avoiding the use of a trademark to monopolize a
design feature which, in itself and apart from its identification of source, improves the
usefulness or appeal of the object it adorns."); Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade
Co., 70 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The doctrine 'prevents trademark law.., from...
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product fea-
ture.'" (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995))).
98 See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774 ("Functional features of a product are features 'which
constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an
assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.'" (emphasis
added) (quoting International Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 441 (1981))). The trigger for the actual benefit
test was explained by Judge Learned Hand in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.:
[I]t is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff in such
cases show that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to mean that
some particular person-the plaintiff may not be individually known-
makes them, and that the public cares who does make them, and not
merely for their appearance and structure. It will not be enough only to show
how pleasing they are, because all the features of beauty or utility which commend
them to the public are by hypothesis already in the public domain.
247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917) (emphasis added). See, e.g., First Brands Corp. v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The parties agree that the shape of
the F-style jug is functional... [because] its shape is conducive to stacking for shipping,
displaying and storage."); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193,
195 (1st Cir. 1980) (affirming that design of stove was functional because it provided supe-
rior heat and cleaning functions); Mershon Co. v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 883 (9th Cir.)
("The words 'White Line' (as they are used, with the layer of white material constituting a
white line around the pad) have no possible functional value and serve no purpose as
descriptive of the article or its use."), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955).
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hand, a feature that provides no value beyond source information or
association is nonfunctional and may therefore receive trademark pro-
tection.99 The actual benefit test is preoccupied with preventing valu-
able intellectual creations from receiving perpetual monopolies via
trademark law.100
For example, in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 1 1 the plaintiff
sold insulation dyed a characteristically pink color.10 2 The plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought to register the color pink with the Trademark
Office for use on its insulation. 10 3 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held
that the color pink, when applied to insulation, was not functional
because there was no benefit to be derived from the use of that
color.104
In contrast, the plaintiff in Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove
Works, Inc.,10 5 manufactured a black, woodburning stove. 10 6 The
plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against the defendant for
selling stoves which, among other things, were also black.10 7 The
court declined to grant the relief sought because the coloration pro-
vided an actual benefit of enhancing heat dispersion.'08
The difference between the indicia of source test and the actual
benefit test is most clearly revealed in Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young
Enterprises.10 9 There, the plaintiff, a prestigious garment manufac-
turer, marketed a line of luggage that was decorated with a repeating
pattern made from its logo." 0 The defendant imitator argued that
the pattern was not used for identification, but rather for decorative
99 See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1064 (3d Cir. 1980)
(affirming that shape and color of pill was nonfunctional because "that trade dress was
arbitrary, having nothing to do with the purpose or performance of the drug, or with its
processing. The only value of the trade dress was in identifying the goods with their source
.... "); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The
district court found that the green-gold color was ornamental and did not make the pad
perform any better than if any other color was [sic] used."), rev'd, 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
100 See Fabrication Enters. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The pur-
pose of the functionality defense is to prevent advances in functional design from being
monopolized by the owner of the design's trade dress in order to 'encourage competition
and the broadest dissemination of useful design features.'" (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay
Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983))); Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc.,
933 F.2d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Basic Lanham Act principles dictate that an owner may
not use a trademark to circumscribe the flow of useful ideas and designs in the market-
place."); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1987).
101 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
102 Id at 1118.
103 See id.
104 Id. at 1122.
105 626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980).
106 Id. at 194.
107 See id. at 193-94.
108 See id. at 195.
109 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
110 See id. at 772.
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purposes."' Therefore, the defendant insisted that the pattern was
functional and hence, unprotectable.112
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the logo pattern did more than
merely identify the source. 113 This finding would have rendered the
pattern functional under the indicia of source test. However, the
court found that the pattern was not functional because the actual
benefit of the pattern was still tethered to the identity of the manufac-
turer. 1 4 Thus, it is easier to obtain a finding of functionality under
the indicia of source test than under the actual benefit test.
3. The "Consumer Motivation" Test
The "consumer motivation" test ascertains a feature's functional-
ity by inquiring whether the feature could persuade a consumer to
purchase a product for reasons other than the reputation of a sponsor
or a source. 115 If the feature whets consumer appetites to such a de-
gree, then it is functional and hence, may not be trademarked. 116 If
the feature does not have such an effect on the consumer, then it is
nonfunctional and may be protected. 117 This test operates by indi-
rectly measuring a feature's non-source-related effect on market de-
l" See id. at 774.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 774-75.
114 See id. at 776-77.
115 See id. at 774 ("Functional features of a product are features 'which constitute the
actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a
particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.'" (emphasis added) (quoting
International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981))); cf. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
711 F.2d 966, 983 n.27 (l1th Cir. 1983) (rejecting counsel's profferedjury instruction that
"[wJhen a feature of goods or of its wrappers or containers appeals to the consumer and
affects his or her choice, that feature is functional" on the ground that counsel's definition
was "overly broad because many nonfunctional, arbitrary features of a product may appeal
to the consumer and affect his or her choice" (quoting Defendant's Request to Charge)).
116 See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981) (affirming
lower court's finding of fumctionality for wall lamps because "[a]lIthough [the court] recog-
nized that architectural compatibility was not the only consideration nor was it always a
consideration in the selection process, [the court] found that it was 'a sufficiently signifi-
cant criterion in a sufficiently number [sic] of elections so that the design ... has aesthetic
or architectural functionality.'" (quoting opinion of the district court) (first alteration in
original)).
117 See Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1029 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[W]here the feature or, more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a
form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification and individu-
ality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection with the product,
imitation may be forbidden [i.e., the feature is nonfunctional]." (quoting Fabrica Inc. v. El
Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)))), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); see, e.g., Fabrica, 697
F.2d at 895 (holding, in relation to a folder containing carpet samples, "[c]onsumers have
no interest in the folders themselves; they merely aid consumers in selecting the actual
product-the carpeting").
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mand. A feature that affects market demand for reasons other than
the reputation of its source is presumed to be an aspect which ought
not be monopolized by trademark. 118
Proving functionality under the consumer motivation test is more
difficult than under the actual benefit test. The distinction between
these two tests is best exemplified in Ives Laboratories v. Darby Drug
Co.119 In Ives, the plaintiff sold a particular prescription vasodilator. 120
The medication occurs as a white, crystalline powder, but was pack-
aged by the plaintiffs in both light-blue and light-blue-and-red cap-
sules.121 The defendant sought to sell the same drug in capsules
bearing the same colors. 122
The trial court found that patients associated those specific colors
with the drug, and consequently, would sometimes experience anxiety
when offered the drug in differently colored capsules. 123 Under the
indicia of source test, the colors used by the plaintiff would have been
deemed functional because they communicated the identity of the
drug in addition to identifying the source. Moreover, under the ac-
tual benefit test, the evidence would have suggested that the colors
were functional because they produced the actual benefit of allaying
patient anxiety.
The court of appeals, however, held that the colors were not
functional, and therefore reversed. 12 4 In doing so, it articulated an
even more stringent standard than the actual benefit test. Specifically,
the court credited testimony which indicated that "when the doctor or
druggist explain [ed] that the different color or different shaped cap-
sules are the same generic drug, patients do not refuse to accept and use
it."125 Therefore, under the more demanding consumer motivation
test, a mere finding of an actual benefit (e.g., patient relief) is imma-
terial if the actual benefit does not affect consumer behavior.12 6
118 Some courts have limited application of the consumer motivation test to features
on the product itself, as opposed to the features on the product's packaging. See, e.g., Fabrica,
697 F.2d at 895-96 (disagreeing that " 'any feature of a product which contributes to the
consumer appeal and salability of the product is, as a matter of law, a functional element of
that product'" and "specifically reject[ing] the notion that a design feature is functional by
definition if it increases appeal and sales of the product" (quoting Vuitton, 644 F.2d at
773)). For more on this distinction, please see infra note 150.
119 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456
U.S. 844 (1982).
120 See id. at 540.
121 See id. at 540.
122 See id. at 540-41.
123 See id. at 547 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
124 See id. at 544-45.
125 Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
126 Ives is a paradigm for this category of cases. The consumer motivation test repre-
sents the notion that not all beneficial product features convey sufficient benefit to affect
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4. The "Commercial Success" Test
Lastly, the "commercial success" test seeks to determine whether
a feature is "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the
product" for reasons other than the identification of a source.1 27 If
the feature aids the manufacturer in such a manner, the feature is
functional and may not be trademarked.1 28 However, if the feature
does not contribute to the commercial success of the product beyond
identification of the feature's source, the feature is not functional and
thus, may obtain trademark protection.
Of the four tests under the identification theory, the commercial
success test imposes the heaviest burden upon the party seeking to
demonstrate functionality. Unlike the consumer motivation test, the
commercial success test is not concerned with whether a feature could
have piqued an ordinary consumer's interest, but whether the market
actually did find (or could find) the feature to be appealing. Thus,
the evidence presented for the commercial success test ought to focus
on market data as opposed to consumer appeal.
For example, in Ives, the court complained obiter that the defen-
dant imitators had failed to "offer any survey of patients' attitudes with
respect to [their choice of brand]," whereas "there was evidence that
many generic drugs ... are successfully marketed in capsules or tab-
lets that do not copy [plaintiff's] trademarked product."'129 Thus, the
evidence sought by the Ives court was clearly empirical in nature.
Similarly, in Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries,'30 the plaintiff at-
tempted to enjoin the defendant from copying one of its luminaire
designs.' 31 In affirming the trial court's denial of the injunction, the
consumers. In such cases, the consumer may not be aware of a choice, may choose to
purchase a random brand, or may delegate the selection to someone else.
For example, because the medication in Ives was sold by prescription, the initial choice
of which manufacturer's drug to use resided with the ultimate consumers' doctors and
pharmacists. Permitting the doctor or pharmacist to select the specific brand of medica-
tion is an indication that either the consumer does not care enough about the particular
manufacturer or that the consumer doesn't know that he has such a choice. In either case,
it is an example of how variation in the brand does not affect the consumer's motivation.
127 Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 19 (2d
Cir. 1984) (A feature "is not functional if it is an 'arbitrary embellishment-primarily
adopted for purposes of identification and individuality,' but 'an important ingredient in
the commercial success of the product' is clearly functional." (quoting Ives Lab., Inc. v.
Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979))).
128 SeeTransgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1028-29 (9th Cir.
1985) ("If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a pat-
ent or copyright." (quoting Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 894-95 (9th Cir.
1983) (quoting Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)))), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986).
129 Ives, 638 F.2d at 545.
130 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
131 Id. at 823.
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Third Circuit approvingly recited the trial court's empirical finding
that the design was functional because it was "'a sufficiently significant
criterion in a sufficiently number [sic] of elections so that the design of a
particular wall mounted luminaire has aesthetic or architectural func-
tionality."1 3 2 Thus, the commercial success test is concerned with the
presentation of empirical data on consumer response to a product
design.
C. Why These Tests Belong Under the Identification Theory
Having comprehensively surveyed the tests under the identifica-
tion theory, it is fruitful at this point to explore how and why these
four tests constitute a distinct conception of functionality. Under the
identification theory, a feature deserves trade-dress protection if that
protection only enables the manufacturer to identify itself to the mar-
ket. In other words, the identification theory does not seek to extend
trade-dress protection to features that accomplish more than source-
identification. Prohibited functions of protected trade dress would
therefore include non-source-identifying ornamentation.
As Part III will set forth in greater detail, the competition theory
denies trademark protection to a feature if such protection eliminates
a competitive market for the product upon which the feature appears.
Thus, the competition theory generally regards only the few features
that are essential to a product as "functional." All other features can
be trademarked. Because ornamental features are rarely necessary to
any product, their monopolization would likely not be expected to
foreclose the market for that product.
For example, ornamental features such as china patterns, 33 lamp
designs,' 34 or totebag features 35 would be functional under the iden-
tification theory because they do more than merely identify the manu-
facturer. In contrast, they are likely to be nonfunctional under the
competition theory because their monopolization would not necessar-
ily shut the market for china,' 36 lamps,'3 7 or totebags' 38 respectively.
The four tests presented above belong in the identification the-
ory's camp because they would find all three examples to be func-
tional. None of the features in the three examples are limited to the
identification of source. All three of the features also confer actual
132 Id. at 826 (quoting opinion of the district court) (emphasis added).
133 SeeVilleroy &Boch Keramische Werke K.G.v. THO Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619, 620 (2d
Cir. 1993); Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 340.
134 See Keene, 653 F.2d at 823.
135 See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1985).
136 See Wil/eroy, 999 F.2d at 621.
137 See Keene, 653 F.2d at 826.
138 See LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76-77.
1998] 1141
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
(aesthetic) benefits beyond source identification. 3 9 Moreover, the
features are often a dispositive factor in a consumer's purchasing deci-
sion.' 40 Finally, it is more likely than not that market data will confirm
that each of the three exemplary features contributes to the commer-
cial success of their respective products.141 Therefore, it seems clear
that the four tests are more consistent with the identification theory
than with the competition theory.
III
THE "COMPETITION" THEORY OF FUNcTIONALriY AND ITs TESTS
A. The "Competition" Theory
The "competition" theory of functionality142 is currently the pre-
vailing theory in the courts143 and is embraced by the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition. 44 The competition theory is best ex-
plained in the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the identification theory:
139 See Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int'l, Ltd., Nos. 95-55990 & 95-56087, 1996 WL
534373, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 1996) (unpublished decision) ("[I]f exclusive use of the
product's feature 'would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvan-
tage,' then the feature is functional." (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159, 165 (1995))), cert. denie, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
140 See LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78 (rhetorically asking, "Are consumers likely to purchase
a LeSportsac bag rather than that of a competitor principally because they find LeSport-
sac's particular combination of design features aesthetically pleasing, or will they buy prin-
cipally because the product features serve to identify or distinguish the goods as genuine
LeSportsac products?").
141 See, e.g., Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979) ("'Func-
tional' . .. might be said to connote other than a trademark purpose. If the particular
feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product, the interest in
free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright.'" (quoting
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952))); cf Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying "that the functionality inquiry
[under the competition theory] is equivalent to the 'important ingredient in commercial
success' test" and recognizing that "a distinctive design or arrangement of features that is
an important ingredient in the commercial success of a product but is not 'essential to the
use or purpose' of the product and does not 'affect[ ] the cost or quality' of the product
could be protectable trade dress." (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 850 n.10 (1982)) (second alteration in original)).
142 At least one court has referred to the competition theory as the "utilitarian" test for
functionality. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 427 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 736 F.2d 1526 (1984). Other courts have also referred to the tests for "actual bene-
fit," "essentialness to use," and "relation to use" as "utilitarian" tests. See, e.g., In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In addition, some commentators
have used the term "utilitarian" to connote the "tests" used in the nascent stages of the
functionality doctrine's development. In order to avoid confusion, this Note will not em-
ploy the term "utilitarian" to denote any general conception of functionality.
143 See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 426 ("Th[e] general trend to limit the functionality doctrine
promotes the Lanham Act's purpose of protecting product distinguishability.").
144 See RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). Specifically, section
17 of the Third Restatement defines functional in the following manner.
A design is "functional".. . if the design affords benefits in the manufactur-
ing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with which the design is
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[It is an error] to ... define nonfunctional as serving primarily to
identify the manufacturer. Understood literally, this would mean
that if a particular design feature had two equally important pur-
poses, one to please consumers and the other to identify the manu-
facturer, it would be functional. But a trademark, especially when it
is part of the product, rather than being just the brand name, is
bound to be selected in part to be pleasing; so this definition of
functionality could rule out trademark, protection for design
features.
[IT] he fact that a design feature is attractive does not, to repeat, pre-
clude its being trademarked. If effective competition is possible
without copying that feature, then . . . it is not a functional
feature. 145
Thus, the competition theory holds that a feature is functional if
conferring trademark protection for that feature would enable the
trademark holder to prevent other suppliers from competing over the
market for the product.14 6 The competition theory permits a broader
scope of product features to be trademarked than does the identifica-
tion theory,147 because the former's tests for functionality are
grounded in the pro-competition concerns of trademark law.148 In
other words, the competition theory posits that the functionality limi-
tation exists to safeguard market competition for intellectual prod-
ucts.149 Thus, any mark that does not weaken such competition is not.
functional, and hence, may receive trademark protection. 150 Conse-
used, apart from any benefits attributed to the design's significance as an
indication of source, that are important to effective competition by others and that
are not practically available through the use of alternative designs.
Id. (emphasis added).
145 W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 341-43 (7th Cir. 1985).
146 See Oratz, supra note 14, at 5 ("The test for functionality has been articulated in
numerous ways, but the heart of the test appears to be whether the design affords utilita-
rian benefits that competitors cannot effectively duplicate through the use of alternative
designs.").
147 Cf Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429-30 ("By restricting the doctrine of fimctionality, we pre-
serve the ability of producers freely to select distinguishing designs and identifying
marks.... A finding of nonfunctionality [under authority identified in this Note as
favorable to the competition theory] will mean that a wide array of choices remain avail-
able to prospective competitors .... ").
148 See United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034
(3d Cir. 1984) ("Several courts have noted that the key policy served by barring the use of
functional features for identification is the policy favoring competition, and that the 'func-
tionality' inquiry must be addressed in light of this policy.").
149 See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429 ("The ultimate inquiry concerning functionality, how-
ever, is whether characterizing a feature or configuration as protected 'will hinder compe-
tition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of goods
... .'" (quoting In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982))).
150 Some courts have carefully distinguished between features on the product (prod-
uct "configurations") and features on product packaging (product "packaging") in deter-
mining the scope of protection under the competition theory. The competition theory is
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quently, the competition theory allows more features to be trade-
marked than the identification theory.
The competition theory of functionality currently embraces six
tests which differ from those used under the identification theory.
For the sake of convenience, this Note will refer to these six tests as
the tests for: (1) "comparable alternatives," (2) "essentiality to usage,"
(3) "relation to usage," (4) "ease of manufacture," (5) "effective com-
petition," and (6) "de facto/dejure functionality." As with the identi-
fication theory, the tests presented here constitute a taxonomy which
is highly compromised in the case law.
B. Six Tests Under the Competition Theory
1. The "Comparable Alternatives" Test
The test for "comparable alternatives" asks whether trade-dress
protection of certain features would nevertheless leave a variety of
comparable 151 alternative features that competitors may use to com-
concerned with ensuring that markets for products are not artificially isolated from competi-
tion. Thus, under the competition theory, competitors should only enjoy latitude in imita-
tion of product configurations.
In contrast, there is a presumption that few consumers would purchase a product for
its packaging alone. Thus, courts have been less forgiving in the infringement of packag-
ing. See, e.g., Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d
654, 659 (4th Cir. 1996) (Catalog design was not functional because "while th[e] informa-
tion may be functional, its placement in a 'banner' format across the bottom of each page
is not. ... A myriad of methods of conveying ordering information to customers do not
involve the use of a banner across the bottom of each page of a catalog."); Duraco Prods. v.
Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1448 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Product packaging designs, like
trademarks, often share membership in a practically inexhaustible set of distinct but ap-
proximately equivalent variations, and an exclusive right to a particular overall presenta-
tion generally does not substantially hinder competition in the packaged good, the item in
which a consumer has a basic interest."); Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429 (finding a lemon juice
bottle not functional because "avast number of forms may accommodate the functions of a
citrus juice bottle").
151 The comparability requirement ensures that the first user of a superior construc-
tion or an "industry standard" would not enjoy perpetual rights over the feature. For ex-
ample, in U.S. GolfAssociation, the USGA sought to trademark its system of scoring golf.
749 F.2d at 1030-31. The Third Circuit refused to enforce those rights on the ground that
the scoring system was functional because it had no comparable alternatives:
Although other formulas could be developed to serve the function of hand-
icapping golfers, a particular method of serving that function may be supe-
rior to others....
When products or services of different providers are close substitutes
for one another, the development of "industry standards" for certain as-
pects of the products or services will benefit consumers by facilitating com-
parability between and interchangeability among alternative products. The
fact that any number of standards may be feasible and useful does not
mean that the preferred standard is not "functional," since use of that stan-
dard promotes comparability and interchangeability.... Allowing one pro-
vider to obtain exclusive rights in such a standard would enable it to
exclude competitors desiring to provide the same product or service, partic-
ularly if the original provider... starts with a virtual monopoly. To allow a
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pete in the market. 152 If such alternatives do not exist, the feature is
functional;153 but if such alternatives do exist, then the feature is not
functional.' 54 The comparable alternatives requirement may necessi-
tate more than the mere existence of one alternative, and may instead
require a number of alternatives from which competitors may
choose. 55
This test represents the notion that market competition for a
product is unduly frustrated if protection for one of its features pre-
monopoly over such a standard would defeat the policy of fostering compe-
tition that underlies the functionality doctrine.
Id. at 1034; see also Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 634
(3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] product design [i]s functional if it [i]s 'the best or one of a few
superior designs available.'" (quoting Morton-Norudch, 671 F.2d at 1341)); Keebler Co. v.
Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980) ("There can be little doubt that
Keebler's can is a functional design .... Were this not our holding, the first user of a
container such as the now-standard soup can, potato chip bag, or cracker box would be
able to preclude competitors from using these highly functional containers."); SK&F, Co.
v. Premo Pharm. Lab., 625 F.2d 1055, 1064 (3d Cir. 1980) (affirming that shape and color
of pill was nonfunctional partly because "there is ample evidence that neither the capsule
form nor the color combination reflects any industry practice for the identifications of
diuretics").
152 See Fabrication Enters. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In order
properly to account for [the risk of unintentionally providing the recipient of trade dress
protection with an unfair competitive advantage], a court must examine a number of vari-
ables, including.., the feasibility of alternative designs that would not impair the utility of
the product."); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987) ("In
conducting its [functionality] inquiry, the District Court should assess... the feasibility of
alternative arrangements of functional features that would not impair the utility of the
product." (citations omitted)).
153 See, e.g., U.S. GolfAss'n, 749 F.2d at 1034 (scoring system for golf was functional
because the system was an "industry standard").
154 See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir.
1991) (Restaurant layout was nonfunctional because "[t]hejury heard substantial evidence
of alternative combinations that could be used to compete effectively."), affd, 505 U.S. 763
(1992); Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429 (Lemon juice bottle design was nonfunctional because "a
vast number of forms may accommodate the functions of a citrusjuice bottle."); Tools USA,
87 F.3d at 659 (affirming catalog design as nonfunctional because "[a] myriad of methods
of conveying ordering information to customers do not involve the use of a banner across
the bottom of each page of a catalog").
155 The Third Circuit's insightful opinion in Keene Corp. v. Parajiex Industries, 653 F.2d
822 (3d Cir. 1981), which dealt with the infringement of exterior light designs, was one of
the first to adopt and explain this additional requirement to the comparable alternatives
test:
This court has previously indicated that merely because there are other
shapes and designs "which defendant could use and still produce a worka-
ble" product, the design used is not thereby non-functional.... Because
there are only a limited number of configurations or designs for a lumi-
naire which are architecturally compatible with the type of structures on
which they are placed, the selection of a luminaire design does not have the
unlimited boundaries as does the selection of a wine bottle or ashtray de-
sign ....
Id. at 827 (citation omitted).
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cludes the marketing of equivalent products.156 Conversely, features
that have no such preclusive effect do not improperly inhibit competi-
tion. 157 In order to remove obstacles to a free market, the compara-
ble alternatives test for functionality seeks to safeguard the existence
of competition among similar products. The comparable alternatives
test is the conceptual soul of the competition theory because it en-
sures that goods are differentiated only in insignificant ways and in a
manner that would not adversely affect market competition. As such,
every test under the competition theory emanates from this principle.
2. The "Essential to Usage" Test
As its name implies, the "essential to usage" test asks whether a
feature is essential to the usage of a product 58 Thus, this test is a
variant of the actual benefit test.' 59 However, for a finding of func-
tionality, the essential to usage test requires a higher level of utility
than the actual benefit test.160 Some courts have recast the inquiry
(somewhat circularly) by defining an "essential" feature as one that is
"dictated by the functions to be performed."' 61 Under this test, a fea-
ture is functional if it confers a benefit that is indispensable to the
156 See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429 ("A particular design ... may serve functions demanded
by the product's manufacturer, but it is not thereby rendered legally functional-and thus
unprotectable-unless the design is only one of a limited number of equally efficient op-
tions and free competition would be unduly hindered by according that design trademark
protection.")
157 See U.S. Golf Ass'n, 749 F.2d at 1034 ("Allowing one provider to obtain exclusive
rights in [an industry] standard would enable it to exclude competitors desiring to provide
the same product or service, particularly if the original provider... starts with a virtual
monopoly.").
158 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1983)
("Functional symbols [are] those that are essential to a product's use as opposed to those
which merely identify it.... ."); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir.
1985); see also American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 274 (2d Cir. 1959)
("[T]he more the imitator copies mere arbitrary, ornamental or decorative gadgets that
give the machine its characteristic appearance, as contrasted with functional features that
make it more useful in the performance of its intended purpose, the more the imitator
treads upon forbidden ground."), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
159 See supra Part ll.B.2.
160 See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429 ("A design that merely assists in a product or configura-
tion's utility is not functional and may therefore be protected.").
161 Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting
LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 (quoting Warner Bros., 724 F.2d at 331)) (emphasis added); see
Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 659 (4th
Cir. 1996) ("[T]he functionality inquiry... looks for features that are not merely useful,
but rather 'essential to the use or purpose of the article.'" (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v.
Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982))); Wallace Int'l Silversmith, Inc. v. Godinger
Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79 n.1 (2d Cir. 1990); LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 ("[A) feature
that merely accommodates a useful function is not enough [to be 'essential.']" (quoting
Warner Bros., 724 F.2d at 331)) (quoted in Stormy Clime; 809 F.2d at 975), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
976 (1991); Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429 ("[A] feature will be functional, and not entitled to
trademark or trade dress protection, if it is dictated by utilitarian characteristics or by the
functions that the relevant product or trade dress is intended to serve."); Warner Bros., 724
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product's use.162 If the feature is not essential, the feature is nonfunc-
tional and may consequently receive trade-dress protection. 163
3. The "Relation to Usage" Test
The "relation to usage" test is a creation of the Third Circuit.164
This test asks whether the feature is related to the utilitarian func-
tion of the product or feature. 165 If the feature is highly re-
lated to the product's intended use, then it is functional. 166
F.2d at 330 ("Functional symbols [are] those that are essential to a product's use as op-
posed to those which merely identify it.... .").
162 See, e.g., Ingle Co. v. Videotours, Inc., No. 96-55561, 1997 WL 8495, at *6 (9th Cir.
Jan. 7, 1997) (unpublished disposition) (opening scene of a television program about ani-
mals which featured people interacting with animals was functional because such an open-
ing is an essential feature of any animal show); Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods.,
60 F.3d 964, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (child carrier design was func-
tional because its elements were essential to all child carriers); Wallace, 916 F.2d at 79-81
(baroque curles, roots, and flowers in silverware are functional because they are essential
to silverware designs); see also Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir.
1981) ("Where the feature is essential to the utility of the item, .... it is now well-established
that the functionality prevents the acquisition of a trademark in that feature.").
163 See, e.g., Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 659 ("Attention Body Shop Managers" slogan in cata-
log not functional because it was not essential for all slogans attempting to attract pur-
chaser's attention).
164 In explaining why it chose to create this new standard, the Third Circuit stated:
[A] feature is not functional merely because it makes the product more
attractive to consumers.... [W]e rejected the concept of aesthetic func-
tionality as interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [i.e.,
the identification theory] which suggests the contrary. Rather, we insisted
that a feature have a significant relation to the utilitarian function of the
product before it could be declared functional.
... [W]e also rejected "a standard inquiring whether the specific de-
sign features of the product '[are] competitively essential'." "[M]erely be-
cause there are other shapes and designs 'which defendant could use and
still produce a workable' product, the design used is not thereby non-
functional."
American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted) (final two alterations in original).
165 See Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 1986)
("In this circuit, a particular design is nonfunctional, and therefore entitled to common
law trademark protection, if the design 'is not significantly related to the utilitarian func-
tion of the product, but is merely arbitrary.'" (quoting Keene, 653 F.2d at 825)); United
States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1984)
("[T]he essence of the question is whether a particular feature of a product or service is
substantially related to its value as aproduct or service... ."); Keene, 653 F.2d at 825 ("[T]he
[functionality] inquiry should focus on the extent to which the design feature is related to
the utilitarian function of the product or feature.").
166 See, e.g., Standard Terry Mills, 803 F.2d at 781 (affirming that terrycloth weave pat-
tern was functional because it was related to towel's function by "serv[ing] to make the...
towel strong, durable, and compatible with contemporary kitchen decor"); American Greet-
ings, 807 F.2d at 1142 (affirming that designs on Care Bears teddy bears were functional
because "they contribute[d] to the effectiveness and performance of Care Bears as plush
toy teddy bears"); see also SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1064 (3d
Cir. 1980) (auguring the formulating of the "related to usage" test by commenting obiter
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However, if a feature is not as related, it is nonfunc-
tional.167
The "relation to usage" test is another close variant of the actual
benefit 168 and essential to usage169 tests. More specifically, this test
straddles the boundaries established by the actual benefit test on one
side and the essential to usage test on the other. The relation to usage
test is less sensitive than the actual benefit test because it requires
more than any mere benefit beyond source-identification to find func-
tionality. However, the relation to usage test is more sensitive than
the essential to usage test in that it will regard a feature as functional
even if it is not wholly essential to the product's usage.
4. The "Ease of Manufacture" Test
The "ease of manufacture" test for functionality asks whether a
competitor can manufacture the disputed feature at the same or at a
lower cost if trademark protection were imposed on that feature.1 70 If
a competitor cannot so manufacture the feature, then the feature is
functional. 171 For example, in Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v.
Clark & Clark, the court refused to protect the round shape of pills
because of the economy of manufacturing pills in that particular
shape.' 72 Similarly, in Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc, the court held
that the plastic "flower" created by the sealing of a cellophane wrap-
per over a gift basket was "functional" because it was "one of the most
common . . .shapes in packaging" and therefore, protection of the
feature would "unduly impair competition."'173
This rarely invoked test is analogous to the comparable alterna-
tives test in that it asks whether financially comparable methods of
manufacturing a product without duplicating the controversial fea-
ture exist. If such alternatives are available, then the feature is non-
functional because the infringer could have employed a different
method of manufacture so as to avoid confusion. On the other hand,
that "It]here is no question... that shape and color of a product may... be so related to
the product's intended use as to be functional and thus unprotectable").
167 See Keene, 653 F.2d at 825 ("When the design itself is not significantly related to the
utilitarian function of the product, but is merely arbitrary, then it is entitled to protection
as a design trademark if it has acquired the distinctiveness necessary to achieve a secondary
meaning.").
168 See supra Part II.B.2.
169 See supra Part III.B.2.
170 See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[A]
design feature 'affecting the cost or quality of an article' is one which permits the article to
be manufactured at a lower cost.").
171 See id.
172 Smith, Kline & French Lab. v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725, 730 (3d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 796 (1946).
173 Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 1994).
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if a feature could not be manufactured in an alternative manner that
is equally or less costly, then the feature is merely a consequence of
economic considerations, and the cost advantages inherent to the fea-
ture's manufacturing process warrant finding the feature to be
functional. 174
5. The "Effective Competition" Test
The "effective competition" test asks, in amorphous terms,
whether trade-dress protection for a product's feature would hinder
the ability of another manufacturer to compete effectively in the mar-
ket for the product.175 If such hinderance is probable, then the fea-
ture is functional and unsuitable for protection. 176 If the feature is
not a likely impediment to market competition, then the feature is
nonfunctional and may receive trademark protection.177 In form and
in essence, the effective competition test is simply a direct application
of the competition theory of functionality in the form of a test.178
6. The "De Facto/De jure" Test
The "de facto/de jure" test for functionality is not a conceptually
distinct "test" as much as it is a method of applying the effective com-
174 See alsoJ.R. Clark Co. v. Murray Metal Prods. Co., 219 F.2d 313, 320 (5th Cir. 1955)
(Design of ironing table was not protectable because it was "a result of a well known manu-
facturing process").
175 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) ("The 'ultimate test
of aesthetic functionality' . . . 'is whether the recognition of trademark rights would signifi-
candy hinder competition.'" (quoting REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR CoMPSrroN,
§ 17, cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990))); Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas-
cade Co., 70 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. God-
inger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[T]he functionality inquiry ... should
[focus] on whether bestowing trade dress protection upon [a particular] arrangement of
features 'will hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effec-
tively in the sale of goods.'" (quoting Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,
977 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Sicilia Di P, Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir.)
(quoting In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982)), reh'g
denied, 736 F.2d 1526 (1984)))), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
176 See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981) (affirming
factual finding of nonfunctionality for wall lamps ultimately because "the design of the
Wall Cube was functional to a sufficient extent so that on balance the interest in free
competition in the luminaire market outweighed Keene's interest in having the exclusive
right to the design").
177 See, e.ge, Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 255-57 (5th Cir.
1997) (configuration of Sunbeam kitchen mixer was not functional because "protection of
Sunbeam design would not impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the
sale of goods"), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. Feb. 11, 1998) (No. 97-1317).
178 See Keene, 653 F.2d at 826 (concluding, after canvassing a variety of tests from both
theories, that it "cannot denominate as clearly erroneous the district court's finding that
the design of the [product] was functional to a sufficient extent so that on balance the
interest in free competition in the ... market outweighed [plaintiff]'s interest in having
the exclusive right to the design").
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petition test.179 On matters over which it does not have exclusive ju-
risdiction, the Federal Circuit applies the substantive law of the forum
from which an appeal is taken.'8 0 Thus, the Federal Circuit does not
apply its own law on functionality in all the cases that come before
it.181 However, in trademark cases over which it does exercise exclu-
sive jurisdiction,18 2 the Federal Circuit has favored the de facto/de
jure approach in determining functionality, which was first articulated
in In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.'8s
In Morton-Norwich, the appellant appealed from a decision of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office's Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board which denied the appellant trademark protection for
the shape of its spray bottles.'8 4 The appellant argued that the limit-
less variety of spray-bottle designs, coupled with the distinctiveness of
its own bottle's design, permitted the spray bottle's shape to be trade-
marked.'8 5 Without elaboration, the Board took the contrary position
that the spray bottle's design was functional.' 86 The Federal Circuit
disagreed, distinguishing between the lay definition and the legal defi-
nition of the term "functional":
[T]he label "functional" has dual significance. It has been
used, on the one hand, in lay fashion to indicate "the normal or
characteristic action of anything," and, on the other hand, it has
been used to denote a legal conclusion [i.e., that a feature is
unprotectable]....
... [I]f the designation "functional" is to be utilized to denote
the legal consequence, we must speak in terms of de facto function-
ality and de jure functionality, the former being the use of "func-
tional" in the lay sense, indicating that although the design of a
179 See supra Part III.B.5.
180 See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1438-40 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en
banc); see also Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1032 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (elaborating on Atari and remanding case incorrectly decided under Federal Circuit
precedent for reconsideration under the appropriate law).
181 See, e.g.,Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1562-63 & n.6 (Fed. Cir.) (applying the
Eighth Circuit's substantive law on functionality, but the Federal Circuit's law on patent
issues and on the procedural question of whether jury instructions were sufficient), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 240
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting litigant's use of Federal Circuit precedent in unfair-competition
matter partly because the controlling law was provided under Ninth Circuit case law).
182 Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994) (enumerating appeals over which the Federal Cir-
cuit has exclusive jurisdiction). The most significant provision in this statute relating to
the functionality problem is probably the conferral of exclusive jurisdiction upon the Fed-
eral Circuit over "decision[s] of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks
and other [related] proceedings." Id. § 1295 (a) (4) (B) (formatting altered).
183 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.PA. 1982).
184 See id. at 1334.
185 See id. at 1342 ("The evidence shows that even the shapes of pump triggers can and
do vary while performing the same function.").
186 See id. at 1341-42.
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product, a container, or a feature of either is directed to perform-
ance of a function, it may be legally recognized as an indication of
source. De jure functionality, of course, would be used to indicate
the opposite-such a design may not be protected as a
trademark.187
Thus, under the Federal Circuit's analysis, a feature is de facto
functional if it imparts any utility to the product. 88 However, such a
feature might still be protectable despite its utilitarian benefits. 189
The feature is de jure functional-i.e., unprotectable by trademark
law-only if it is superior to alternative features, thereby enabling the
trademark holder to foreclose competition over the market for the
feature.190 In short, the de jure functionality inquiry is congruent to
the effective competition test and implicates all the tests under the
competition theory.1 1
As mentioned earlier, the de facto/dejure analysis is not as much
a test as it is an approach to the effective competition test which re-
quires a somewhat formalistic recitation of whether the design in
question is de facto functional. 192 If the design is not found to be de
facto functional, then no further investigation need be made to con-
clude that the design itself is protectable. 193 On the other hand, if the
design is found de facto functional, then the factfinder must deter-
mine whether the feature is dejure functional by asking whether pro-
tection of the feature injures effective competition.194 Thus, the de
187 Id. at 1337.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 1338 ("The broad statement... that the design of an article 'having
utility' cannot be a trademark[ ] is incorrect and inconsistent with [the case law].").
190 See id. at 1340 ("'[F]unctionality' is determined in light of 'utility,' which is deter-
mined in light of 'superiority of design,' and rests upon the foundation 'essential to effec-
tive competition .... "); New England Butt Co. v. International Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d
874, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Other factors relevant to the determination of functionality are
... whether 'there are other alternatives available[ ]' and whether a particular design 're-
sults from a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing.'" (quoting Morton-
Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341)).
191 Compare supra Parts III.B.1-5 with supra note 190 and accompanying text.
192 Professor Thomas McCarthy, the author of one of the most celebrated treatises on
trademark law, has criticized the de facto/de jure approach precisely for its unnecessary
use of additional steps and terminology in addressing the abstruse problem of determining
functionality. See McCuART-, supra note 15, at § 7:69, at 7-143 (characterizing the ap-
proach as a "bit of legalese ... [which] only serves to make more enigmatic an already
difficult issue").
193 See, e.g., In re D.C. Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1048 (C.C.P. 1982) (holding that
"[c]learly, the drawings of [comic-book characters on box containing toys for those respec-
tive characters] are not dejure functional [because] they posses no de facto function at all
...); see also, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (color pink on insulation was non-functional because "the color 'pink' has no utilita-
rian purpose" and "performs no non-trademark functional").
194 Compare, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531-33 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (the color black, as applied to outboard boat motors, was de jure functional
because it was a uniquely versatile color that reduced apparent size of motor), cert. denied,
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facto/dejure approach simply incorporates the effective competition
test as the second step in a two-tiered inquiry.
C. Why These Tests Belong Under the Competition Theory
Just as Section II.C explained why the tests described in Section
ILB were categorized under the identification theory, this Section
shows why the six tests set forth above belong to the competition the-
ory. The discussion in Section II.C presented three examples: china
patterns, lamp designs, and totebag features. The discussion estab-
lished that all three would be functional under identification-theory
analysis. However, these examples, when viewed through the lens of
the competition theory, are nonfunctional. Applying each of the
above six tests to the three examples confirms the affinity of these
tests for the competition theory.
Under the comparable alternatives test, the three examples
would not be functional because there are always comparable alterna-
tives to such ornamental designs. Nor would the examples be func-
tional under the essential to usage test because the aesthetic
characteristics are not essential to the products' usage. Additionally,
one cannot fairly say that the aesthetic designs are related to the usage
of the products. Moreover, because the difficulty in manufacturing
different china patterns, lamp designs, or totebag features is negligi-
ble, the three examples are not functional under the ease of manufac-
ture test either. Lastly, monopolization of one ornamental design
does not eliminate effective competition for the entire product type,
and therefore, is also not de jure functional.
In sum, none of the three examples were functional under any of
the six competition tests. This is exactly the result that one would
expect from the competition theory. Accordingly, these six tests align
themselves more readily with the competition theory than with the
identification theory.
IV
THE Two TEoRIEs OF FUNCTIONALrIY AND THE AESTHETIC
FUNGT1ONALrIY PROBLEM
A. Redefining the "Aesthetic Functionality" Problem
Although the identification and competition theories differ on a
fundamental level, their dispute encompasses a very limited set of
product features. Both theories agree that trademark protection
should be unavailable for features which, if granted such protection,
514 U.S. 1050 (1995) with Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341-43 (design of spray bottle was
not dejure functional because other manufacturers could have effectively competed in the
market for sprays without using particular shape of appellant's bottle).
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would interfere with market competition.' 95 Both theories also con-
cur that features which have no value other than the identification of
source should not be barred from trademark protection.1 96
Thus, the only features in controversy are those that have some
value beyond source-identification, but that, if granted trademark pro-
tection, would not collapse the competitive markets for their respec-
tive goods. The controversy between these two competing theories
over this set of features forms the debate over "aesthetic functional-
ity.' a97 From this perspective, the aesthetic functionality problem is
not simply a question of whether ornamental features are protectable.
Rather, it can be redefined as the collision between two compelling
views on the fundamental nature of functionality itself.
The aesthetic functionality problem asks whether a design that is
intrinsically attractive may receive trademark protection. 98 Specifi-
cally, the problem focuses on ornamental features that have the po-
tential to influence consumer behavior, but are neither essential nor
helpful to the primary function of the product.199 In brief, the fea-
tures which fuel the aesthetic functionality debate are the very fea-
tures that lie in the unsettled terrain between the "identification" and
the "competition" theories of functionality.
The identification theory holds that such ornamental features are
functional because they possess some quantum of value beyond the
identification of their source. On the other hand, the competition
theory maintains the opposite view-these features are not functional
because they do not significantly endanger the competitiveness of
their respective products' markets. Thus, the aesthetic functionality
problem demands that courts adopt one of these two theories and
discard the other.200 In order to determine which of these two theo-
195 A feature that inhibits market competition would, by definition, satisfy the comped-
tion test. Moreover, by inductive reasoning, a feature which suppresses market competi-
tion when protected must have some value other than indicia of source. Thus, the feature
would also always satisfy the identification theory.
196 The reasoning behind this statement is almost identical to the reasoning behind
the preceding sentence. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. By definition, a fea-
ture that has no value other than identification does not trigger foreclosure of trademark
protection under the "actual benefit" test Moreover, it is inconceivable that a feature
which has no value other than source identification can restrain competition.
197 See M. Cunningham, Utilitarian Design Features and Antitrust Parallels: An Economic
Approach to Understanding the Functionality Defense in Trademark Litigation, 18 HASTnGS
Comm. & ENr. L.J. 569, 578-81 (1996) (describing the aesthetic functionality problem's
genesis).
198 See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
199 See Michael S. Perez, Note, Reconciling the Patent Act and the Lanham Act: Should Prod-
uct Configurations Be Entitled to Trade Dress Protection After the Expiration of a Utility or Design
Patent? , 4 TEx. INtELL. PROp. LJ. 383, 390-91 (1996).
200 At least one court has taken note of this theoretical schism. In Sicilia Di R. Biebow
& Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 736 F.2d 1526 (1984), the Fifth Circuit
observed that
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ries better resolves the aesthetic functionality problem, both must be
measured against the purposes of the functionality doctrine.
B. Purposes of the Functionality Doctrine
The functionality doctrine is a judicial expression of caution di-
rected against conferral of trade-dress protection. As such, the ulti-
mate purpose of the functionality doctrine is to establish limits to
trademark protection. 201 Thus, tests for functionality do not ask what
may be protected, but rather, what may not. There are two apparent
purposes for the functionality doctrine: (1) to prevent the perpetual
monopolization of valuable product features, and (2) to partition the
law of intellectual property between trademark and other forms of
protection (e.g., copyright and patent).202
1. Prevention of Perpetual Monopolies
The functionality doctrine is keenly concerned with preventing
overbroad grants of trademark protection. This concern is significant
because trademark protection has an indefinite duration. 20 3 Thus,
courts have awarded trademark protection warily in order to avoid
Courts have differed in applying functionality to deny protection to
designs or configurations that serve some functional purpose. Some courts,
for example allow the copying of features or designs that are somewhat
utilitarian, even though they may be distinctive or identifying. In other
words, only if the design or configuration has identification of source as its
sole purpose will it be entitled to trademark protection. Other courts have
realized, however, that many designs and features have both functional and
identifying aspects.... Thus, protection may be accorded a distinctive or
identifying design, even though that design is also related to function.
Id. at 425 (citations omitted).
201 See Fabrication Enters. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If trade
dress protection of product design goes too far, however, the public may be deprived of
the benefits of robust competition by precluding use of utilitarian product features. In
consequence, the doctrine of functionality limits the extent of trade dress protection of
product design.").
202 See McCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 7:65-7:66, at 7-125 to 7-131.
203 Cf. Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir.
1992):
The rationale for the functionality limitation on trade dress protection "has
as its genesis the judicial theory that there exists a fundamental right to
compete through imitation of a competitor's product, which right can only
be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws." To allow indefinite
trademark protection of product innovations would frustrate the purpose
of the limited duration of patents to foster competition by allowing innova-
tions to enter the public domain after seventeen years.
Id. (quoting In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); Wolf,
supra note 4, at 441 ("The Doctrine of Elections evolved from a belief that trademark
protection combined with design patent protection converts the limited monopoly granted
under the design patent into a perpetual monopoly.").
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conferring perpetual monopolies for features that are protected more
properly under impermanent protections.20 4
By ensuring that valuable features do not receive trade-dress pro-
tection, the functionality doctrine prevents manufacturers from ac-
quiring exclusive rights in marketable product features.20 5 The
economic significance of such an exclusive right is considerable: pro-
tecting a feature from imitation allows the trade-dress holder to exer-
cise a legally enforced monopoly over products bearing that
feature.2 06
In essence, permitting a valuable feature to receive trade-dress
protection disrupts free market competition 20 7 by enabling the trade-
dress holder to establish a price above the competitive equilibrium for
products bearing that feature.208 Such a privilege (i.e., a monopoly
over a useful design) is anathema to the cardinal tenet of free-market
economics: namely, that prices are optimally established in the long
run only through the unregulated interaction between supply and de-
mand.20 9 A legally enforced monopoly deviates from the free-market
vision because such a monopoly prevents suppliers from competing
204 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1530 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The trade-
mark is misused if it serves to limit competition in the manufacture and sales of a product.
That is the special province of the limited monopolies provided pursuant to the patent
laws." (quoting Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th
Cir. 1979))); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir.) ("The require-
ment of nonfunctionality is based 'on the judicial theory that there exists a fundamental
right to compete through imitation of a competitor's product, which right can only be
temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws.'" (quoting Morton-Nonich, 671 F.2d at
1336)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,
519 (10th Cir. 1987) ("A recurring concern [which] encourages a broad definition of
'functional,' is that granting protection to a feature will create a monopoly which would
prevent others from successfully competing with the individual who developed the
feature.").
205 See Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1028 (9th Cir.
1985) ("If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a pat-
ent or copyright." (quoting Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 890 (9th Cir.
1983) (quoting Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952)))), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1059 (1986).
206 See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 661 (observing that reputation need not be a barrier
impeding entry into markets).
207 See Dumas, supra note 11, at 479.
208 See Cunningham, supra note 197, at 574; see also FRANKLN M. FisHER, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION, ECONOMICS AND THE LAw 19-21 (John Monz ed., 1991) (explaining difficul-
ties in applying theory to practice); ROGER SHERMAN, THE REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 64-65
(1989).
209 This "cardinal tenet" is an invariant lesson in almost every basic economics course.
See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILUAM D. NoRDHAus, ECONoMics 443 (13th ed. 1989) ("A
thousand forces affect price. But in a freely competitive market, they do so only by acting
through supply and demand.... Interferences with supply and demand will often lead to
inefficient pricing and allocations." (formatting altered)). However, the principle oper-
ates upon several assumptions, such as perfect information and zero transactions costs
(which trademark partly seeks to remedy). SeeR. H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3J.L.
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with the monopolist in the market for the protected product.210 By
ensuring that grants of such monopolies are confined to features with
minimal value beyond source-identification, the functionality doctrine
prevents trademarks from disabling the very markets that they attempt
to foster.211 Thus, the functionality doctrine does not actively pro-
mote competition-rather, it fosters competition by preventing mar-
ket participants from erecting permanent obstacles against market
entrants.212
2. Partitioning of Intellectual-Property Law
The functionality doctrine also aids in distinguishing trademark
law from other bodies of intellectual-property law.2 13 There is a widely
held belief that trademark law may be liberally extended to fulfill pol-
ECON. 1 (demonstrating "efficient" allocations of liability and externalities in the presence
of zero transactions costs).
210 See FISHER, supra note 208, at 21-25; SHERMAN, supra note 208, at 63.
211 See Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d
654, 658 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The non-functionality requirement for trademark or trade dress
protection 'prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a
firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a usefuil product feature.'" (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 164 (1995))). Another way to view functionality is to see it as a means by which society
values intellectual creations. The greater the value of the innovation, the keener the inter-
est there is in ensuring that the innovation is not perpetually withheld from the public. As
the Third Circuit noted:
The use of "non-functional" features of a product or service to identify its
source is legally protected against imitation by competitors, because the
value of such features in identifying the source of the goods or services
outweighs the social interest in allowing competitors to copy them. Func-
tional features, on the other hand, may not be legally protected methods of
identification, regardless of their association with the original manufac-
turer, because their usefulness in identifying the source of the product or
service is outweighed by the social interest in competition and improve-
ments, which are advanced by giving competitors free access to those
features.
United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir.
1984).
212 See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("'[Tlhe policy predicate for the entire functionality doctrine stems from the
public interest in enhancing competition [;]' however, a court may also consider 'whether
prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the others of something which will substan-
tially hinder them in competition.'" (quoting Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822,
827 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting RESrATE MNT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 742 cmt.a (1938)))). Com-
pare Keene, 653 F.2d at 827 (mistakenly explaining that "the policy predicate for the entire
functionality doctrine stems from the public interest in enhancing competition") with Stan-
dard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[Tlhe func-
tionality doctrine encourages competition by preventing one manufacturer from acquiring
a monopoly by attempting to trademark those features of a design essential to a successful
product of that type.").
213 SeeJeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[O]verextension of trade dress protection can undermine restrictions in copyright and
patent law that are designed to avoid monopolization of products and ideas.").
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icy goals. For example, one court has advocated a broad definition of
trademark protection in order to encourage beauty in product design,
complaining that
[A narrow scope of trade-dress protection] provides a disincentive
for development of imaginative and attractive design. The more ap-
pealing the design, the less protection it would receive. As our am-
bience becomes more mechanized and banal, it would be
unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality
which could transform an ordinary product into one of grace.2 14
Another writer-a commentator-has suggested the expansion of
trade-dress law to cover otherwise unprotectable garment designs in
order to mitigate the unfairness to clothing designers.21 5
These broad conceptions of trademark law are gravely errone-
ous. 2 16 Trademarks are not commercial avenues through which socie-
tal objectives may freely be pursued. Rather trademarks maintain the
workability of the market in the limited ways detailed earlier in this
Note.217 As the Second Circuit explained:
[A] t first glance it might seem intolerable that one manufacturer
should be allowed to sponge on another by pirating the product of
years of invention and development without license or recompense
and reap the fruits sown by another. Morally and ethically such
practices strike a discordant note. It cuts across the grain ofjustice
to permit an intruder to profit not only by the efforts of another but
at his expense as well.
But this initial response to the problem has been curbed in def-
erence to the greater public good.... [I]mitation is the life blood
of competition. It is the unimpeded availability of substantially
equivalent units that permits the normal operation of supply and
demand to yield the fair price society must pay for a given
commodity.21 8
The common misunderstanding over the scope of trademark law
bears directly on the role of the functionality doctrine.2 19
214 Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
215 See, e.g., S. Priya Bharathi, Comment, There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Copycat:
The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
1667, 1691-94 (1996).
216 SeeDumas, supra note 11, at 490 ("ITihe encouragement of imaginative and attrac-
tive designs is not a goal of unfair competition law. . .
217 See'supra Part I.A.
218 American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir.) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 361 U.S 915 (1959).
219 One of the most elegant admonishments against the overexpansion of trademark
came from the Second Circuit:
Courts must proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered
trademark protection in the design of products so as not to undermine the
objectives of the patent laws.... By bestowing limited periods of protection
to novel, non-obvious, and useful inventions and new, original, and orna-
1998] 1157
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Intellectual properties are safeguarded by distinct bodies of
law.220 The three prevailing forms of protection for such properties
are trademark, patent, and copyright law. Each body of law protects
specific types of intellectual creations and each form accords a differ-
ent term of protection. Trademarks protect designs used to identify a
commercial source or sponsor for an indefinite period of time.221
Utility patents protect technological innovations222 for 20 years, 223
whereas design patents protect "new, original and ornamental de-
sign[s] for an article of manufacture"224 for 14 years.225 Lastly, copy-
rights protect non-utilitarian artistic works. 226 For individual authors,
copyrights can survive the death of the creator (or the last co-creator)
by 50 years.227 For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, or works
for hire, copyrights endure for 75 years after the time of first publica-
tion, or 100 years after the time of creation, whichever expires first.2 28
mental designs... the patent laws encourage progress in science and the
useful arts. Society reaps the rewards of these advances in the short term to
the extent that patent holders and their licensees incorporate protected
ideas into new and useful products. These rewards are more fully realized
in the longer term because novel ideas fall into the public domain upon the
expiration of patent protection. Since trademark protection extends for an
unlimited period, expansive trade dress protection for the design of prod-
ucts would prevent some functional products from enriching the public
domain.
This threat is particularly great when, as in the instant case, a first man-
ufacturer seeks broad trade dress protection for a product on the ground
that its arrangement of predominantly functional features is distinctive....
To avoid undermining the purpose of the patent laws to place useful
innovations in the public domain after expiration of a limited monopoly,
courts must be sensitive to whether a grant of trade dress protection would
close all avenues to a market that is otherwise open in the absence of a valid
patent.
Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations omit-
ted); see also Fisher Stoves, 626 F.2d at 196 (recognizing that the "d] efendant, in imitating
[the plaintiff], is doubtless sharing in the market formerly captured by the plaintiff's skill
and judgment. While we sympathize with plaintiff's disappointment at losing sales to an
imitator, this is a fact of business life.").
220 See David W. Opderbeck, Form and Function: Protecting Trade Dress Rights in Product
Configurations, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 1, 2 (1996) (noting that "[p]roduct design features
may be protected by several species of intellectual property rights" and listing design pat-
ent, copyright, and trade dress as the appropriate bodies of law).
221 See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
222 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
223 See id. § 154(a) (2). Utility patents may be extended under special circumstances.
See id. § 154(b). However, the period of extension is never perpetual. See id.
224 Id. § 171.
225 See id. § 173.
226 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-105 (1994).
227 See id. § 302(a)-(b).
228 See id. § 302(c). The copyright durations given in the text apply to works created
on or after January 1, 1978. See id. § 302. The term of copyright protection for works
created before January 1, 1978 is given in 17 U.S.C. §§ 303-304. Although works falling
under the latter category may, in some cases, receive broader protection than their later
counterparts, the term of protection for these works is still finite. See id.
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Measured by duration, trademarks confer the longest protection, fol-
lowed by copyrights, and then by patents.229
In its earliest incarnations, the functionality doctrine found shape
in the belief that utilitarian features were more properly protected
under the fleeting aegis of the patent statutes, rather than the endless
vigilance of the trademark laws.230 However, this primitive exposition
of the functionality doctrine misapprehended the complete role of
the functionality defense. 23' The functionality doctrine exists not
only to separate trademarks from utility patents. Rather, as its evolu-
tion in the case law reveals, the functionality doctrine also seeks to
fragment the whole of intellectual-property protection into separate
spheres by assigning creations of ingenuity into discrete legal catego-
ries.23 2 More specifically, the functionality doctrine prevents designs
from attaining a longer period of protection than they deserve. 233
This understanding of functionality explains why the functional-
ity doctrine also prevents copyrightable and design-patentable cre-
ations from enjoying trademark protection. Copyrights and design
patents are assigned to certain valuable, non-utilitarian designs for fi-
nite periods of time.23 4 Accordingly, features protectable by copy-
rights and design patents do not deserve perpetual protection
through trademark law.23 5 The "aesthetic functionality" doctrine, by
preventing copyrightable and design-patentable features from receiv-
229 For purposes of this discussion, this Note will omit reference to the possibility that a
trademark may become generic, and thus unprotectable.
230 See Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 732 (3d Cir.
1957) ("The purpose of th [e functionality] rule is obviously to prevent the grant of perpet-
ual monopoly by the issuance of a trade-mark in the situation where a patent has either
expired, or for one reason or another, cannot be granted."). But cf. SK&F, Co. v. Premo
Pharm. Lab., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]here is no suggestion in the
Sears and Compco cases that federal patent policy somehow limited the scope of section
43(a), for the Court had no need in those cases to address the reach of a federal tort over
which Congress has complete control.").
231 See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 19-20
(2d Cir. 1984) ("In the context of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 'functional' is not synony-
mous with 'utilitarian,' nor is it the antonym of 'ornamental.' Indeed, ornamentation may
be the thing that sells the product.").
232 See, e.g., Falk supra note 16, at 842 (suggesting that "[u]nder a properly defined
functionality doctrine, a configuration that alone qualifies for a utility patent would neces-
sarily meet the definition of functionality"); P&rez, supra note 199, at 397-99 (discussing the
increasing overlap between patent law and trade-dress law).
233 See Dumas, supra note 11, at 479 ("The functionality doctrine prevents the other-
wise inevitable clash between free competition and trademark protection that occurs when
trade dress protection is extended beyond a product's packaging to its design.").
234 See supra notes 224-28.
235 The Fifth Circuit explained the difference between trademark and copyright in the
following terms:
The copyright laws are based on an entirely different concept than the
trademark laws, and contemplate that the copyrighted material, like pat-
ented ideas, will eventually pass into the public domain. The trademark
laws are based on the needed protection of the public and business inter-
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ing more protection (via trademark law) than Congress has permitted
under the copyright and patent statutes, is thus an inescapable corol-
lary of reading trade-dress law in the context of those very laws.23 6 In
doing so, the aesthetic functionality doctrine cleaves a rift between
trademarkable creations and those better suited for copyright or de-
sign-patent protection.
Notably, there is a "functionality doctrine" in copyright law which
limits the scope of trademark protection.23 7 The Supreme Court in-
troduced this doctrine in Baker v. Selden.238 In Baker, the plaintiff
sought exclusive rights over both the design and system of an account-
ing ledger.2 9 The Court held that, although the design was protect-
able under copyright, the accounting system was not.2 40 Specifically,
the Court reasoned that "[t]o give to the author of [a] book an exclu-
sive property in the art described therein... would be a surprise and
a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of
copyright."241
Although copyright functionality is not identical to trademark
functionality, they operate on the same basic principles.2 42 A design
that has utility may not receive copyright protection because it is
"functional." Thus, the design can, at most, be patented.243 Because
ests and there is no reason why trademarks should ever pass into the public
domain by the mere passage of time.
Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
236 Some have even suggested that the roots of the prohibition against trademark pro-
tection for copyrightable or patentable designs are grounded in Constitutional soil. See,
e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Coying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of
Trade Dress Protection, 86 TRADEMARK RPP. 223, 265-66 (1996) ("Because the Lanham Act
can no more abrogate constitutional mandates than can other federal legislation, its poten-
tially perpetual protection does not reach individually functional elements-not only be-
cause the Act does not expressly address them, but because it cannot do so." (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added)); Wolf, supra note 4, at 444 (claiming that a major issue in
granting trademark protection to design patented features is "whether the trademark pro-
tection constructively 'stretches' the life of the patent beyond the limited scope constitu-
tionally allowed" (footnote omitted)); id. at 463-70 (same issue with conferral of trademark
protection to copyrighted materials); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress
shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
237 See generally Dumas, supra note 11 (discussing the differences between copyright
and trademark similarity and suggesting intermingling of various aspects between the two).
238 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
239 Id. at 99-100.
240 Id. at 104-05.
241 Id. at 102.
242 See Dumas, supra note 11, at 471 ("Although functionality is a common defense,
courts employ different tests for determining functionality in trade dress and copyright
infringement actions.").
243 Cf 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1997) ("The following are examples of works not subject to
copyright and applications for registration of such works cannot be entertained: ... (b)
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a patent's duration is shorter than that of a copyright,2 44 the opera-
tion of copyright fimctionality confirms the theory that a feature's
functionality limits the duration of protection that feature may re-
ceive.2 45 Moreover, copyright's functionality enables copyrightable
products to be separated from patentable products. 246
To summarize, the "partitioning" capacity of functionality sorts
intellectual creations into the legal categories specifically designed to
protect those creations. Under the current scheme of intellectual
property, three areas of interaction exist among the three dominant
bodies of intellectual-property law: (1) between trademark and pat-
ent;247 (2) between trademark and copyright;248 and (3) between
copyright and patent.2 49 The traditional understanding of functional-
ity, which was based on utility, partitioned patentable features from
trademarkable features. Aesthetic functionality seeks to partition de-
signs protectable by trademark from those protectable by copyrights
and utility patents. Lastly, copyright functionality partitions copyright-
able designs from patentable ones. In sum, functionality separates
these three bodies of law by determining the appropriate form of in-
tellectual-property protection to govern any given design.
Ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in
which they are expressed or described in a writing.").
244 Compare supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (patent durations), with supra
notes 226-28 and accompanying text (copyright durations).
245 Closely related to the functionality doctrine is the doctrine of elections, which lim-
its an inventor to receiving one form of intellectual-property protection for any particular
feature, as opposed to multiple forms of protection. As the United States Copyright Office
has indicated:
"While the design patent act establishes an absolute monopoly, it lasts for a
relatively short duration of fourteen years. Protection under copyright, on
the other hand, lasts for life of the author plus fifty years, but protects only
against copying... Yet, if design patent and copyright can cover the same
design ..... the owner would benefit from a 'super monopoly' unaffected
by important limitations in both the patent and copyright statutes. In the
absence of any clear indication that Congress intended such an expansive
system of protection to apply to certain designs, the Copyright Office be-
lieves the sounder public policy requires an owner to elect between systems
of protection."
Wolf, supra note 4, at 466 (quoting Letter from Kent Dunlap, Principal Legal Advisor,
Copyright Office, to Douglas K Wolf (Apr. 17, 1991)).
246 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
247 For a good discussion on the interaction between trademark and utility patents, see
generally Falk, supra note 16. With respect to trademark's relations with design patents,
see Nrez, supra note 199, at 398-408, 413-14.
248 See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the Close Associa-
tion Become., 29 SANTA Ca.RA L. REv. 89 passim (1989) (describing the intersection between
the copyright and trademark paradigms).
249 See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. Rv. 2432, 2453-500 (1994) (reviewing American and European treatment of
situations occurring at the edges of copyright and patent laws); John Shepard Wiley, Jr.,
Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. Cni. L. REv. 119, 121-27 (1991) (questioning the
viability of the metaphysical distinctions between copyright and patent).
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C. Resolving the "Aesthetic Functionality" Problem
In order to determine whether the identification theory or the
competition theory best addresses the aesthetic functionality problem,
it is necessary to compare their respective capacities at serving the pur-
poses of functionality-namely, the preservation of competition and
the partitioning of intellectual-property law. Subsection (1) first ex-
amines the relative ability of the theories to preserve competition.
Subsection (2) then determines which theory of functionality better
partitions the various bodies of intellectual-property law.
1. The Interest in Preventing Perpetual Monopolies
Both theories prevent the hindrance of competition by prevent-
ing the monopolization of designs essential to a product's success.
Thus, competitors producing the same product are not foreclosed
from the market merely because someone holds exclusive rights to
one of the product's essential features. By definition, this is the role
of the competition theory. Because the identification theory prevents
monopolization of even more features than the competition theory,
the identification theory protects competition equally well, if not bet-
ter than, the competition theory.
Moreover, market competition is not measured solely by the ab-
sence of barriers to entry into industries. Removal of those barriers
serves the even higher goal of ensuring that the individual products in
these industries are sold at the lowest price that society (through the
market) is willing to pay for the product.250 In other words, free mar-
ket competition does not merely forbid the monopolization of designs
in a manner that would prevent competitors from creating similar
products, it requires that every design be sold at the lowest price
possible.
250 See GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 180, 182 (4th ed. 1987) ("In competi-
tive equilibrium marginal costs of all firms are equal, and thus no reduction in total [socie-
tal] costs would be possible by reshuffling output among firms."). The lowest price that
society is willing to pay for any given product is determined by the producer as well as by
the consumer. The lowest price that a consumer would be willing to pay for any product is
zero. Obviously, producers would never produce anything in a world where everything was
free. Thus, to speak of "society" setting the prices for goods is to also take into account the
lowest price at which producers would still be willing to manufacture goods for sale.
Conversely, the lowest price that society is willing to pay for any given product is not
simply the lowest price at which producers would be willing to manufacture them either.
This is so because the lowest price at which producers are willing to manufacture products
may be higher than what any consumer would be willing to pay for them. For example, a
producer might be willing to sell bottles of air for a dollar (which, we will assume, reflects
the costs expended in collecting, bottling, and marketing the air). However, no consumer
would conceivably be willing to purchase bottles of air at that price (or, for that matter, at
any price).
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Only the identification theory ensures the lowest equilibrium
price. The identification theory forbids the monopolization of orna-
mental features. Thus, manufacturers are free to imitate the adorn-
ments on each others' products. Competition among manufacturers
forces the price of products down to the lowest price sustainable in
the market. Thus, the identification theory fosters competition
through price as well as through innovation.
In contrast, the competition theory permits the monopolization
of product embellishments. Although such a system provides greater
incentives for manufacturers to produce innovations in aesthetic de-
sign, the perpetual duration of such protection is overbroad. The
competition theory, by insulating the holder of a protected ornamen-
tal design from subsequent competition, provides few incentives for
that manufacturer to sell that design at the lowest possible price.2 51
Thus, the competition theory does not protect competition as well as
the identification theory.
2. The Interest in Partitioning Intellectual-Property Law
The identification theory is also superior to the competition the-
ory in partitioning the various forms of intellectual property from one
another. The identification theory rests on the view that no device
should receive trademark protection unless its effects are strictly lim-
ited to the source-identifying purposes of trademark protection. Con-
sequently, the identification theory of functionality prevents
trademark law from expanding into the provinces of patent and copy-
right. More importantly, the identification theory prevents trademark
law from appropriating designs from the public domain for exclusive,
private use.
Not all intellectual creations are legally entitled to protection. 252
In the current stage of intellectual property's development, creations
that deserve protection sometimes fall through the cracks at the inter-
stices between the domains of patent, copyright, and trademark.253 As
tempting as it may be to extend trademark law in order to rescue
those creations from imitation by undeserving competitors, it is not
the role of trademark law to serve as a catch-all mechanism for the
251 See id. at 197-98 & Fig.12-1 (showing why a profit-maximizing monopolist would not
choose to produce goods at the lowest price).
252 See Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[I]t is
not the purpose of unfair competition law, under the guise of either consumer protection
or the protection of business good will, to implement a policy of encouraging innovative
designs by protecting them once designed. Those issues are the province of copyright and
patent laws." (citations and footnote omitted)). However, some courts and commentators
have deliberately used the competition theory as a "loophole" to further other policy goals.
See, e.g., supra notes 214-15.
253 See generally Brown, supra note 11, passim (attempting to justify expansion of trade-
dress protection).
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protection of intellectual creations which are not currently protected
by another body of intellectual-property law. To expand trademark
protection into those areas would interfere with legislative efforts at
fashioning additional forms of intellectual-property law to protect
those creations. 254
Moreover, the current systems of copyright and patent law pro-
vide sufficient protection to a vast majority of distinctive features not
protectable by trademark. Although there are still unresolved issues
concerning the scope of these laws, the problem of features falling
through the cracks should be addressed by adjusting the scope of the
intellectual-property laws, and not by uprooting the theoretical foun-
dations of trademark protection.
The competition theory is less sensitive than the identification
theory to the boundary between the public domain and trademark
because the competition theory proceeds from a premise opposite
that of the identification theory. The competition theory assumes
that any aspect of a product's appearance has the ability to designate
origin. In other words, under the competition theory, there is a prima
facie presumption that all designs receive protection. 255 Thus, the
competition theory curbs the informational use of product features
when protection of those features would threaten competition for the
class of products bearing them. The competition theory's presump-
tion, however, is erroneous.
As discussed earlier, the current bodies of intellectual-property
law protect very specific classes of intellectual creation. 256 They are
not formless doctrines which can be freely molded by the demands of
equity to shelter features from imitation. By assuming that they are,
the competition theory poorly accommodates functionality's role as a
barrier between trademark and the public domain.
254 For example, as evidence of Congressional interest in trade-dress mattersjust three
months prior to the publication of this Note, a bill was presented to the U.S. House of
Representatives to amend the Lanham Act in an effort to codify the law of trade-dress
protection. See H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (1998).
255 This presumption is consistent with the case law regarding the burden of proof. In
trademark infringement actions, a plaintiff seeking to prove that a feature deserves protec-
tion needs only to show that the feature has secondary meaning. When applicable, it is the
defendant's burden to demonstrate that the feature does not merit protection because it is
functional. Because the competition theory favors the plaintiff with a prima facie presump-
tion of protection, it follows that, under the competition theory, the burden of proof
should be placed on the defendant as required by the case law. See Danielle Rubano, Note,
Trade Dress: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proving or Disproving Functionality in a Section 43(a)
Infringement Claim?, 6 FoRDHAM INUL. PROP. MEnIA & ENTr. L.J. 345, 363 (1995) ("A fed-
eral common law that would not require either party to prove functionality or would only
protect nonfunctional features if competition was 'unduly hindered' by the copying of
those features would create a conflict with patent limitations.")
256 See supra notes 220-226 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the competition theory inadequately separates trade-
mark law from the laws governing patents and copyrights. 25 7 The
competition theory grants trademark protection to any feature that
contains trademarkable elements.258 For example, a feature that has
copyrightable or design-patentable elements combined with
trademarkable features could receive trademark protection under the
competition theory. Not only does such a conclusion disregard the
existence of other forms of intellectual-property protection, such pro-
tection would also usurp the Constitutionally ordained purview of the
copyright and design-patent laws.259 Thus, the competition theory
permits the overbroad extension of trademark law. The competition
theory's inadequacy in guarding the public domain from private ap-
propriation suggests that the competition theory is inferior to the
identification theory in fulfilling the functionality doctrine's purpose
of separating the various intellectual-property doctrines.
CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to accomplish four objectives. First, it
has attempted to spin the tangled web of functionality case law into
distinct tests.260 Second, it has attempted to weave these tests into two
patterns of thought: the identification theory and the competition
theory.261 Third, this Note has identified the tension between these
two theories as the source of the aesthetic functionality conun-
drum.2 62 Lastly, this Note has implicated functionality as an impor-
257 See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th
Cir. 1995) (holding in the context of competition-theory tests that "the functionality doc-
trine does not eliminate overlap between the Patent Act and the Lanham Act"), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1067 (1996).
258 See Vuitton et Fils SA. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[A]
trademark which identifies the source of goods and incidentally serves another function
may still be entitled to protection.").
259 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. It was precisely this non-contextual con-
struction of trademark law that led the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now
the Federal Circuit) to allow trademark protection for comic-book characters-creations
which arguably ought to be protected under copyright:
[A] matter of public policy ... is that if trademark rights are recognized in
a picture of a product, the product design itself may be perpetually pro-
tected, contrary to the limited term of protection afforded some designs
under the copyright or design statutes.... Given the differing concepts of
the statutes, this court has adopted the position that each statute must be
interpreted independently of each other and that no one of these statutes
... preempts the other.
In re D.C. Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citations omitted).
260 See supra Parts II.B & III.B.
261 Compare supra Part I with Part Ill.
262 See supra Part IV.A.
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tant mechanism by which the various bodies of intellectual property
law are partitioned.2 63
The aesthetic functionality problem is simply an evolved manifes-
tation of the familiar functionality inquiry for utilitarian features. In
the early cases concerning functionality, the inseparable but untena-
ble merger of utilitarian and putative source-identifying facets into a
single feature framed the issue of whether such features were protect-
able under trademark law. Recast in a different formulation, the
courts' dilemma was essentially to determine which of these two facets
would best serve the public.
On the one hand, by choosing the source-identifying aspect over
the competition aspect (i.e., by allowing trademark protection for util-
itarian designs), private individuals are given pecuniary incentives to
pursue innovations in utilitarian design. Such a rule anticipates that
the public will benefit from the resultant bounty of human ingenuity.
This regime, however, contemplates rewarding the innovator with a
permanent monopoly over the feature.
On the other hand, by allowing free imitation of the feature, the
economic motives to innovate are effectively extinguished. In their
place, though, are incentives for market participants to produce
goods bearing desirable features. Under this rule, the public benefits
from the low prices forced down under the weight of many suppliers
in the market.
In the context of utilitarian features, the courts have uniformly
found that competition through free imitation (rather than innova-
tion through trademark protection) better serves the public interest.
This does not mean that there are no incentives for innovation.
Rather, the case law simply implies that non-perpetual forms of pro-
tection, such as copyrights and patents, are more appropriate for the
fostering of innovative design.
Moreover, a manufacturer that seeks to identify itself could do so
using any mark, name, or feature from a boundless universe of such
devices. In contrast, the accommodation of a utilitarian function is
often limited to a few choices, or even just one choice, of design. The
limited ways in which a product's utility can be "expressed" demand
their unfettered availability to the public, whereas the unlimited selec-
tion of means by which a manufacturer could identify itself sustains
the argument for exclusivity in the case of source-identifying marks.
The reasoning employed in deciding the (non)protectability of
utilitarian design under trademark law is readily transposable to
analogous problems of aesthetic design. Unlike the narrow, if not sin-
gular, options for accommodating utilitarian function, the range of
263 See supra Parts IV.B.2 & IV.C.2.
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choices for commercially viable aesthetic expression is as infinite as
that for source identification. This Note argues that, despite the eco-
nomic differences between utilitarian features and aesthetic features,
the courts should conclude, as they did on the issue of utilitarian fea-
tures, that aggressive price competition better serves the public than
the encouragement of innovation for aesthetic features. To establish
this symmetry, this Note urges adoption of a conception of functional-
ity that disallows protection to any feature that does not serve only to
identify the source.
Significantly, the standard urged here is not that the feature must
only identify the source. Rather, the endorsed standard is that the
feature only serve to identify the source. The former erroneously con-
flates the functionality inquiry with secondary meaning, a separate re-
quirement for trademark protection that dictates the minimal level of
public recognition of the mark.2 6 4
By employing the identification theory, the courts can confine
trademarks to their role as providers of reputational information. In
doing so, they more soundly accommodate functionality's role both as
a curtain between the various forms of intellectual property and as a
bulwark against the undue expansion of trademark law into the un-
protectable areas of the public domain.
264 The confusion between functionality and secondary meaning is most likely to occur
in cases where a manufacturer selects a non-utilitarian feature to identify itself, but has not
used it enough such that consumers are readily able to associate the mark with the manu-
facturer. If an infringer subsequently marketed the feature for its aesthetic value, it may
seem that the design is "functional."
This exact situation arose in International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindenburg & Co,
633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980). There, the court held that certain designs, intended by a
fraternal organization as its identifying insignias, could be imitated because they were
"functional." Id. at 920. In doing so, the court distinguished Boston Professional Hockey Asso-
ciation v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), which held
that the design of cloth patches used as a logo for a national hockey team, was not func-
tional, id. at 1013. Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 918-19. As this comparison shows, the func-
tionality inquiry in Job's Daughters implicated the issue of whether the mark was well-known
to the general public.
The thorny issue of whether a little-known design could be protected is known as the
'secondary meaning in the making." SeeJoel S. Armstrong, Comment, Secondary Meaning
"In The Making" in Trademark Infringement Actions Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 14
GEO. MAsON U. L. REv. 603 (1992). The Supreme Court, however, seemed to resolve this
issue in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., by allowing "inherently distinctive" features,
regardless of whether they possessed secondary meaning, to receive trademark protection.
505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992).
The "secondary meaning in the making" problem is beyond the scope of this Note. It
is mentioned here only to point out that the "secondary meaning in the making" issue tests
the cognizance of the design as a source-identifier, whereas the functionality inquiry (espe-
cially as defined by the identification theory) considers the cognizability of the design as an
indicator of source. Thus, the two issues are not identical.
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